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代写paper,Transnational Organized Crime
发表日期:2013-09-15 09:13:29 | 来源:assignment.cc | 当前的位置:首页 > 代写paper > 正文
Transnational Organized Crime

1) Describe the role and function of the Transnational Organized Crime Convention and the Convention’s relationship to its Protocols.

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (also known as the ‘Palermo Convention’) has attached to it the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 2000, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 and is “the main instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime”. It entered into force on 29 September 2003.

States that ratify the instrument commit to taking a series of measures against transnational organized crime, including the creation of domestic criminal offences; the adoption of new and sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation; and the promotion of training and technical assistance for building or upgrading the necessary capacity of national authorities.

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and its Protocols are not human rights instruments in themselves, but have instead been described as providing “treaty framework to help states unite to combat transnational organised crime”. One commentator views the Convention and its Protocols as a framework of guidance which needs “filling in”, particularly in the areas of the exchange of information, the registration of biodata and the building of common entrance policies. The Protocols are not binding upon signatories of the Convention itself unless the signatory also becomes a party to the Protocol.

The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime states itself that its purpose is “to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively”. Article 3 provides that the Convention applies to a range of offences that the Convention criminalizes when they are transnational in nature, and then spells out that such an offence is transnational in nature if: (a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. The Protocols then add to the list of crimes contained in the Convention.

As Kofi Annan states in the foreword to the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Criminal groups have wasted no time in embracing today’s globalized economy and the sophisticated technology that goes with it. But our efforts to combat them have remained up to now very fragmented and our weapons almost obsolete. The Convention gives us a new tool to address the scourge of crime as a global problem. With enhanced international cooperation, we can have a real impact on the ability of international criminals to operate successfully and can help citizens everywhere in their often bitter struggle for safety and dignity in their homes and communities.”

2) What do we mean by the term ‘securitisation’ of transnational crime? Do you think policies that ‘securitise’ TNC are useful?

In basic terms, the securitisation of transnational crime means the movement of legislative bodies from viewing crime in a cultural, social, economic and/or legal context to viewing transnational crime as a matter of national security.

The Copenhagen School defines the concept of securitization: “Securitization refers to the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an existential threat”. Transnational crime may be presented as an existential threat to the security of nations through the discourse that political leaders utilise, but also through others. Transnational crime has been referred to as a security issue in the academic literature. McFarlane and McLennan claimed in 1996: “Transnational crime is now emerging as a serious threat in its own right to national and international security and stability”.

In modern times, forms of transnational crime in the Asia Pacific have been securitized - that is, represented by policy elites and security actors as crucial or existential threats to national and regional security.

At the first summit of ASEAN heads of state and government held in Bali in 1976 President Suharto declared: “Our concept of security is inward looking, namely, to establish an orderly, peaceful and stable condition within each territory, free from any subversive elements and infiltration, wherever their origins may be”. Galeotti has recently indicated that “the struggle against organized and transnational crime will be the defining security concern of the twenty-first century”.

As Emmers states “transnational crime poses a threat to states, national economies and civil societies.” He provides the example of non-state actors using terrorism to promote their political causes. In his opinion the groups are able to gain strength from their ability to forge links across national boundaries and in turn are able to threaten national sovereignty and the integrity of independent states with the result that they can effectively threaten the survival of the governments of those states. However, it is not just terrorism which may be ‘securitized’, other forms of transnational crime affect states and their societies. As Emmers again notes, “drug trafficking and money laundering reduce a government’s capacity to govern, weaken the credibility of financial institutions and undermine social order”.

Nevertheless, Emmers has also expressed the opinion that the problem of transnational crime could be dealt with more effectively if it was approached primarily as a criminal matter rather than as a security issue. He notes that the concept of securitization of transnational crime can work better in some nations than others, depending on the commitment shown by those nations to tackle transnational crime in a security driven way.

Comparing the US and the ASEAN states he says that in the US the securitization rather than the criminalization of terrorism has allowed the US to use more traditional security responses against al-Qaeda, with the obvious rhetoric being “War on terror”. It may therefore be argued that where a state is prepared to tackle transnational crime in traditional, often military, ways, policies that securitize transnational crime are indeed useful.

However, it has been argued by Emmers that where states are not prepared or are unable to tackle transnational crime in a traditional security based way, criminalization rather than securitization, should take precedence. As Emmers states: “In the context of Southeast Asia, ASEAN may be advised to further rely on the criminalization of transnational crime, as it does not dispose over the collective will, joint political instruments and military capabilities to match its rhetorical claims about security”. He also argues that transnational crime being seen in a criminal context rather than a security one could lead to better results. In his 2002 paper he suggests that criminal activity cannot be solved by resorting to the traditional security means, such as army activation and concludes: “The US war on drugs in Columbia and its failure to reduce the supply of narcotics in America is testimony to that reality.”

3) Briefly describe the role of globalisation in modern TNC.

In order to describe the role of globalisation in modern transnational crime, it is useful to consider what ‘globalization’ really means. As Gros states, “globalization does not mean the same thing to all people” and therefore there is “confusion around what it is and what it does”. Gros defines globalization as “the deregulation of national economies and financial markets, on the one hand, and their international integration under the aegis of free-market ideology on the other”.

In policy terms, globalization often entails the deregulation of capital flows, eviction of the state from areas that concern production and the privatization of former state-owned enterprises, reduction in the size of government, trade liberalization and the creation of large trading blocs.

Wright argues that the globalization of business serves to foster organized crime. He states that “In the case of organized crime (and arguably in the case of international business ethics) we should not be surprised at the failure of the invisible hand of the market to control malpractice.” Furthermore, he states that it is “for this reason, at least part of the solution to the problem of organized crime is not connected to law enforcement at all ... It is connected to the further development of the free associations of civil society which can influence government policy and eventually relegate organized crime to the status of a fringe activity.”

The impact of globalization on transnational crime can be seen by looking at examples from previously communist and less capitalist regimes. As Sanz and Silverman explain, in the past 30 years or so Communist countries throughout Asia and the Pacific rim have moved toward a more capitalist economic system. These countries’ business communities have welcomed capitalism because it provides more entrepreneurs to achieve greater independence and a richer standard of living.

This economic shift in turn receives support from foreign investors. Furthermore, the general population also embrace the capitalist system because it is able to provide new goods and services. As Sanz and Silverman conclude, “such changes bring us closer to a global economy which will open new markets and expand opportunities for both legitimate and criminal entrepreneurs”.

This can be seen in Poland where, “many new kinds of economic and financial crimes appeared along with the free-market economic system – crimes that had been typical and known for decades in capitalist countries but which had not appeared in Poland for the past 45 years”.

The voluntary relaxation or involuntary loss of state control domestically and at international borders coupled with the fact that mechanisms of state governance and incidents of sovereignty have been lost, altered, or sacrificed to produce domestic economic change and promote international trade mean an increase in the ease with which international criminals can operate. As Myers states: “while this is a gross simplification of the complex issues unique to each state individually, and to regional and global alignments generally, it points to salient factors, which have permitted criminal groups whose activities had domestic, regional or limited international impact to become transnational in scope.”

4) What role does technology play in modern TNC, both from the point of view of assisting TNC and assisting its interdiction?

Following on from the impact of globalization on transnational crime is the impact of technological advances. As McFarlane comments, technology enables and increases the capacity of “transnational organised crime and terrorist groups to exploit advances in electronic banking, encryption, telecommunications, developments in global travel and commerce, and … visa free regimes”.

Furthermore, it may be difficult for law enforcement agencies to keep pace with the developing technologies which are capable of being exploited by criminal groups. As McFarlane states, “transnational organised crime and terrorist groups are usually small and flexible organisations capable of ‘buying the best brains’ to enable them to respond to new technologies more quickly than slow, bureaucratic government agencies”.

One particular consideration is the technological advancement of travel (for example speed boats and aeroplanes). It is true that the technological advancement of transportation has had the effect of bringing Southeast Asia closer to Western markets with a quick and, relatively speaking, safe method of moving contraband. As Sanz and Silverman suggest, “global criminal ventures are now facilitated by the ease of catching a flight and quickly travelling to a country in which one is virtually unknown to the authorities”.

As well as making contact between criminal organizations quicker and more accessible, allowing easily planned and accomplished transnational crimes, technological advancements also make the perpetration of certain crimes easier and has even brought new crimes into existence. Again, Sanz and Silverman comment “technological advancements… make it easy to counterfeit nearly anything from currency to clothing to watches. Technology has also made it relatively easy to obtain a new identity. Medical advances have created a growing demand for human organs, while technological growth has created a market for trade secrets and information about new product research.” Since the break-up of the Soviet Union there has also been, of course, a development of a black market in high tech and nuclear weapons.

In terms of transnational criminal finance, technology has had a very important role to play. As Glynn et al. (1997: 12) note, “the emergence of an electronic financial system markedly enhances opportunities for corruption, the difficulty of controlling it, and the potential damage it can inflict.” Indeed, Gros notes that anyone can move currency around the world, with at least some delay in being caught. He goes on to suggest that transnational criminal organizations are able to recognize opportunities not only in terms of transportation but also with regards the “fluidity of money markets” allowing for “movement of illicit profits in and out of countries that are at the epicentre of globalization.”

However, technology is not all bad in the fight against transnational crime. For example, the tracing of transnational crime has been made easier by technology in that money can now be tracked across borders through the international banking system. See Dobinson for an interesting case study of how $40 million US dollars was traced across Australia and Hong Kong.

Advances in technology also allow law enforcement agencies to update their national systems quicker, alert border control authorities and potentially enable the passing of information between states more efficiently, enabling transnational crime to be prevented, controlled and prosecuted more effectively.

5) What impact have the provisions for Mutual Legal Assistance and the Exchange of Information in the Transnational Organized Crime Convention had on the sharing of intelligence multi-laterally?

As one commentator notes, “obtaining physical custody of fugitives means little absent the evidence needed to convict them at tria”l. MLATs provide assistance at all stages of criminal investigations and prosecutions. Available assistance under MLATs includes bank or other financial records, witness statements and testimony, search and seizure of people and things, and immobilization and forfeiture of the proceeds of criminal activity.

As an example of how a MLAT has worked in practice, in 1997 the US made an MLAT request to Canada on behalf of prosecutors who were investigating a murder. Pursuant to the request, the US sought and obtained from the Canadian authorities the murder suspect’s car, copies of airline ticketing records, billing information and other evidence which was then used to secure a conviction.

However, in the absence of a specific treaty provision, there is no mechanism whereby parties can be obliged to use formal mutual legal assistance provisions to obtain evidence abroad. In Re Sealed Case the US Court of Appeals rejected the argument that US law enforcement agencies were limited to obtaining evidence in accordance with the provisions set out in a mutual legal assistance treaty signed by the Swiss and US Governments.

The appellant refused to comply with a subpoena to appear before a US court to produce documents relating to Swiss companies. Rejecting the argument that compliance with the request would be contrary to Swiss secrecy laws and in breach of international comity, the court held that it could ‘order any party within its jurisdiction to testify or produce documents regardless of a foreign sovereign’s view to the contrary.

In Southeast Asia, the picture is complicated, with intelligence sharing and cooperation proving successful but only where the information is not of a nature that will challenge the political rulers of the states. As Emmers recently concluded, there has been success between Sinapore, Malaysia and the Philipines in the context of exchanged information, particularly leading to extradition proceedings. As recently as April 2007, Singapore and Indonesia signed an Extradition Treaty in order that terrorist suspects can be dealt with in the appropriate legal systems. However, despite these examples of bilateral cooperation, Southeast Asian states “resist sharing sensitive information on domestic matters that could embarrass or challenge the political positions of ruling elites”.

Furthermore, difficulties in information sharing and mutual legal assistance may arise where there is a difference between the legal systems of the relevant states. For example, countries which have no mutual legal assistance treaties with Italy have tended to attract Mafia criminals, yet even where agreements have been in place other members of the Mafia have been able to live openly despite the existence of serious criminal charges outstanding against them.

Jamieson provides an example of when the jurisdiction of the requested country does not acknowledge the Italian crime of membership of a mafia-type association or, as in the case of the Netherlands and Germany, where crimes of conspiracy do not exist there is a loophole created. The case of the camorra member Michele Zaza exemplified this: Zaza was wanted in Italy since 1984 on charges relating to his purported Mafia association, as well as murder and drug trafficking. His extradition was sought by Italy, however, he was allowed to live openly in France (apart from serving a two year sentence for cigarette smuggling). In fact it was not until 1993 that he was finally re-arrested and extradited to Italy, where he later died in jail.

As well as the more ‘pure’ forms of mutual legal assistance provided for in modern times, training has also been an important part in collaboration. Peter Gastrow, a Special Adviser to the Minister of Safety and Security in South Africa identified the police force there as benefiting from international expertise in several areas including: detection and investigative methods; narcotics trafficking; motor vehicle thefts and smuggling; white collar crime, including money laundering and fraud; official corruption; and cross border arms smuggling.

Bibliography

Bantekas, I. & Nash, S. (2007), International Criminal Law, Routledge-Cavendish, pg 401

Brolan, C. (2002), “An analysis of the human smuggling trade and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) from a refugee protection perspective”,IJRL 14, 561

Callahan, T. (1997), “Transnational crime strikes South Africa”, Crime and Justice International, 13 (2) 9

“Denying safe haven to international criminals: international crime control strategy”, Trends in Organized Crime, 4 (1), 25

Dobinson, I. (1993), “Pinning a tail on the dragon: the Chinese and the international heroin trade”, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 39 (3), 373

Elliott, L. (2007), “Transnational environmental crime in the Asia Pacific: an ‘un(der)securitized’ security problem?”, Pacific Review 20 4, 499

Emmers, R. (2002), “The securitization of transnational crime in ASEAN”, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, no. 39

Emmers, R. (2007), “Comprehensive security and resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s approach to terrorism and sea piracy”.

Emmers, R. (2003), “ASEAN and the securitization of transnational crime in Southeast Asia”,Pacific Review 16 3, 419

Galeotti, M. “Underworld and Upperworld: Transnational Organized Crime and Global Society” in Josselin, D. & Wallace, W. (eds) (2001), Non-State Actors in World Politics, London: Palgrave Publishers, pg 216

Glynn et al. (1997: 12)

Gros, J.G. (2002), “Trouble in paradise: crime and collapsed states in the age of globalisation”,British Journal of Criminology, 63

Hansen, L. (2000), “The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29(2), 288

Interview with Mr J. Bijen from the IAM (‘Information and Analysis Centre for Smuggling of Human Beings’), The Hague, the Netherlands, 17 July 2000

Jamieson, A. (1995), “The transnational dimension of Italian organized crime”, Transnational Organized Crime, 1 (2), 151

McFarlane, J. (2005), “Regional and international cooperation in tackling transnational crime, terrorism and the problems of disrupted states”, JFC 301

McFarlane, J. & McLennan, K. (1996), Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm, Working Paper no. 294, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, pg 2

Myers, W. (1995), “Orb weavers – the global webs: the structure and activities of transnational ethnic Chinese criminal groups”, Transnational Organized Crime, 1 (4), 1

Plywaczewski, E. (1997), “Organized crime in Poland”, Transnational Organized Crime, 3 (3), 109

‘Proposed Solutions to Trafficking’ (2000) 21 Refugee Reports (US Committee For Refugees)

Sanz, K. & Silverman, I. (1996), “The evolution and future direction of Southeast Asian criminal organizations”, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 12 (4), 285

Singh, S. (2001), “Framing ‘South Asia’: Whose imagined region?”

United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime available athttp://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html

Wright, A. (1996), “Organized crime in Hungary: the transition from state to civil society”,Transnational Organized Crime, 3 (1) 68

 

“联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪
1)描述跨国有组织犯罪公约“和”公约“的关系及其”议定书“的作用和功能。
联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约“ (又称”巴勒莫公约“ )已连接到它的打击偷运移民的议定书” , 2000年,海,空公约关于预防,禁止和惩治贩运人口特别是妇女和儿童,打击非法制造和贩运枪支及其零部件和弹药议定书。
联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约“是2000年11月15日联合国大会第55/25号决议通过,是”打击跨国有组织犯罪的主要工具“ 。它于2003年9月29日生效。
国家批准该文书承诺,采取了一系列措施,打击跨国有组织犯罪,包括国内刑事犯罪的创作,通过引渡,司法协助和执法合作的新的和扫地的框架;培训和技术推广协助建立或升级的必要能力的国家机关。
联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪及其“议定书”公约“是不是在自己的人权文书,但反而被形容为”条约框架,以帮助各国团结起来,打击跨国有组织犯罪“ 。一位评论员认为, “公约”及其“议定书”的框架指导需要“填充” ,特别是在生物数据信息,注册普通高考政策和建设等领域的交流。不具有约束力的协议,除非签署后,签署“公约”本身也变成了“议定书”的缔约国。
联合国打击跨国有组织犯罪公约“的规定,其目的是”促进合作,更有效地预防和打击跨国有组织犯罪“ 。第3条规定,该公约适用该公约为犯罪行为时,他们是跨国性质的一系列罪行,然后阐明了这样的罪行是跨国性质的,如:(一)它致力于在一个以上的国家(二)犯罪在一国实施,但其准备,筹划,指挥或控制的实质性部分发生在另一国; (三)在一国,但涉及有组织犯罪集团从事犯罪活动的多个一个国家或(四)犯罪在一国实施,但在另一个国家有重大的影响。的协议,然后添加到列表“公约”所载的罪行。
正如科菲·安南在打击跨国有组织犯罪公约“的前言中, ”犯罪团伙已经没有时间浪费在拥抱今天的全球化经济和先进的技术,用它去。但我们的努力,打击他们仍然非常分散,我们的武器几乎已经过时。该“公约”为我们提供了一个新的工具,以解决犯罪祸害作为一个全球性的问题。加强国际合作,我们可以有一个真正影响国际罪犯的能力,成功地运作,可以帮助世界各地的公民在他们经常在自己的家园和社区的安全和有尊严的苦战。 “
2)是什么意思'证券化'的跨国犯罪吗?你认为'证券化' TNC政策是有用的吗?
在基本条件,跨国犯罪的证券化是指运动的立法机构查看在观看跨国犯罪作为事关国家安全的文化,社会,经济和/或法律背景的犯罪。
哥本哈根学派证券化的概念定义: “资产证券化是指的过程中提出一个问题,在安全性方面,换句话说,作为一个生存的威胁” 。跨国犯罪可以作为一个现实存在的威胁国家安全的话语通过政治领袖利用,而且还通过他人。跨国犯罪已被称为是一个安全问题在学术文献中。麦克法兰和麦克伦南在1996年声称: “跨国犯罪,现在出现在自己的权利,国家和国际安全与稳定的严重威胁” 。
在近代,亚太地区的跨国犯罪形式已被证券化 - 那就是,所代表的国家和地区安全的关键或存在威胁的政策精英和安全行为者。
于1976年在巴厘岛举行的东盟国家元首和政府首脑的首次会晤总统苏哈托宣布: “我们对安全概念的内向型,即每个区域内,建立一个有序,和平和稳定的条件,不受任何颠覆性的元素和渗透,无论它们的起源可能是“ 。加莱奥蒂近日表示,“有组织犯罪和跨国犯罪的斗争,将是二十一世纪”的定义的安全关切。
由于Emmers状态“跨国犯罪状态,国家经济和公民社会构成了威胁。 ”他提供的例子非国家行为者使用恐怖主义,以提高他们的政治原因。在他看来,群体能够从他们的能力,跨越国界建立联系,从而获得力量能够威胁到国家的主权和独立国家的完整性,其结果是,他们可以有效地威胁到这些国家政府的生存。然而,它不只是恐怖主义,这可能是“证券化” ,其他形式的跨国犯罪影响的状态和他们的社会。二粒再次指出,“贩毒和洗钱,减少政府的统治,削弱了金融机构的信誉,破坏社会秩序”的能力。
尽管如此, Emmers还表示,跨国犯罪的问题​​,可以处理更有效,如果它接近主要为刑事案件,而不是作为一个安全问题的意见。他指出证券的跨国犯罪的概念可以更好地工作比其他一些国家,根据这些国家的承诺,打击跨国犯罪,安全驱动的方式。
比较美国和东盟国家,他说,在美国的证券化,而不是恐怖主义定罪允许美国对基地组织( al - Qaeda )使用更传统安全响应,具有明显的“反恐战争”的修辞。因此,它可以说,状态准备方式传统,经常是军人,打击跨国犯罪,证券跨国犯罪的政策的确是有用的。
然而,它已被认为状态都没有准备,或无法在传统的基于安全的方式对付跨国犯罪,定罪,而不是证券化,应采取优先二粒。作为Emmers状态: “在东南亚的背景下,东盟可能会建议进一步依靠跨国犯罪的定罪,因为它没有处理过的集体意志,共同的政治手段和军事能力,以配合其安全修辞声称” 。他还认为,被视为跨国犯罪的刑事背景下可能会导致更好的结果,而不是一个安全。在他2002年的纸,他建议犯罪活动不能被解决,诉诸的传统的安全手段,如军队激活,并得出结论: “美国的战争在哥伦比亚和其故障减少毒品在美国供应药物是证明了这一点现实“。
3 )简述现代跨国公司在全球化的作用。
为了描述在现代跨国犯罪全球化的作用,它是有用的,要考虑什么“全球化”的真正含义。格罗斯指出, “全球化并不意味着同样的东西给所有的人”,因此有“混淆它是什么和它做什么” 。格罗斯将全球化定义为“国家经济和金融市场放松管制,一方面,他们的国际一体化的自由市场意识形态的主持下,在其他的” 。
在政策方面,全球化往往需要放松对资本流动的状态,驱逐从关注生产和私有化的原国有企业,减少政府的规模,贸易自由化和大型贸易集团创造的领域。
怀特认为业务的全球化供应,促进有组织犯罪。他指出, “有组织犯罪的情况下(可以说在国际商业道德的情况下) ,我们不应该感到惊讶,在市场这只看不见的手来控制医疗事故的失败。 ”此外,他指出,这是“这个原因,至少部分有组织犯罪的问题​​解决没有连接到执法,在所有...它连接到公民社会的自由联想,可以影响政府政策,并最终贬有组织犯罪的边缘活动状态的进一步发展。 “
看着从以前共产主义和资本主义制度的例子可以看出,全球化对跨国犯罪的影响。作为桑斯和西尔弗曼解释的,在过去的30年或共产主义国家,整个亚洲和环太平洋走向更资本主义经济制度。这些国家的企业界欢迎的资本主义,因为它提供了更多的企业家来实现更大的独立性和更丰富的生活水平。
这种经济转型又收到从外国投资者的支持。此外,一般人群也拥抱了资本主义制度,因为它是能够提供新的商品和服务。由于桑斯和西尔弗曼结论是,“这样的变化给我们带来接近到全球经济,这将打开新的市场和扩大合法和刑事企业家”机会。
这可以看出,在波兰,其中, “经济和金融犯罪出现了许多新的种随着自由市场经济体制 - 犯罪了典型和被称为几十年来在资本主义国家,但没有出现在波兰,在过去的45年。“
自愿放松或自愿丧失国家控制的国内和国际边界加上主权国家治理和事故的机制已经遗失,涂改,或牺牲国内经济的变化和促进国际贸易的事实意味着增加在易用性国际罪犯可以操作。正如迈尔斯说:“虽然这是​​总简化复杂的问题,每个国家独有的个别区域和全球的路线一般,它指向的突出因素,允许犯罪团伙的活动有国内,地区或国际上的影响有限成为跨国的范围。 “
4)什么样的作用的技术发挥,无论是从现代TNC TNC协助,并协助其停职点?
从全球化的影响,跨国犯罪,是技术进步的影响。作为麦克法兰的意见,技术使容量增加“跨国有组织犯罪和恐怖主义集团利用电子银行,加密,电信,全球旅行和电子商务的发展, ...免签证入境制度的进步” 。
此外,也可能是执法机构难以跟上发展的技术能够被犯罪团伙利用。麦克法兰指出,“跨国有组织犯罪和恐怖组织通常是小而灵活的组织精干”买最好的头脑,使他们能够更迅速地应对新技术较缓慢,官僚政府机构“ 。
一个特别要考虑的是技术进步的行程(例如,快艇和飞机) 。它是真实的,运输的技术进步已经产生了影响,使东南亚接近西方市场的一个快速,相对而言,安全的方法移动违禁。由于桑斯和西尔弗曼认为, “全球犯罪企业现在赶航班的易用性和快速行驶的国家,其中一个几乎是未知当局”促进。
技术的进步以及更快,更方便的犯罪组织之间的接触,允许方便地计划和完成的跨国犯罪,也更容易犯下某些罪行,甚至带来了新的犯罪存在。同样,桑斯和西尔弗曼评论“的技术进步很容易假冒几乎任何东西,从货币到服装到手表。技术方面也取得了相对容易获得一个新的身份。医学的进步创造了一个不断增长的需求,为人体器官,而商业秘密和新产品的研究信息技术发展已创造了一个市场。 “既然分手的苏联也一直存在,当然,发展的在高科技和核武器黑市。
在跨国犯罪融资方面,技术已经发挥了非常重要的作用。由于格林等人。 ( 1997年: 12 )注意, “电子金融系统出现明显提高的腐败,控制它的难度,和它可能造成的潜在损害的机会。 ”事实上,格罗斯指出,任何人都可以将世界各地的货币,至少有一些延迟,在被抓。他建议能够认识到不仅在交通方面的机会,跨国犯罪组织还与有关货币市场的“流动性”,使“非法利润运动的是在震中全球化的国家和“。
然而,技术并不全是坏事,在打击跨国犯罪。例如,追踪跨国犯罪活动已经取得了技术,钱更容易,现在可以通过跨越国界的跟踪国际银行体系。见DOBINSON一个有趣的案例研究如何40000000美元被曝在澳大利亚和香港。
技术进步也让执法机构更新本国的系统更快,警惕的边境管制当局可能使通过国与国之间更有效的信息,从而使跨国犯罪被阻止,更有效地控制和起诉。
5)什么样的影响有相互法律援助和信息交流的跨国有组织犯罪公约“中有关于分享情报多侧面的规定?
正如一位评论家指出, “获得物理保管逃犯意味着几乎没有缺席的证据判他们有罪TRIA ”L 。法律互助条约在刑事调查和起诉的各个阶段提供帮助。法律互助条约下可提供的援助包括银行或其他金融记录,证词和口供,搜查和扣押的人与事,固定和没收犯罪活动的收益。
MLAT曾在实践如何作为一个例子,在1997年,美国MLAT请求加拿大代表谁正在调查一宗谋杀案的检察官。根据要求,美国寻求和获得加拿大当局谋杀嫌疑人的车,航空公司票务记录,计费信息和其他证据,这是当时用来固定定罪副本。
然而,在一个特定的条约规定的情况下,有没有机制,使各方可以必须使用正式的相互法律协助的规定,从国外获取证据。在重新密封外壳,美国上诉法院驳回了这一论点,美国执法机构只限于根据载于由瑞士和美国政府签署法律互助条约的规定取证。
上诉人拒绝遵守传票出现之前,美国法院出示证件,有关瑞士公司。拒绝的说法,符合要求的将是相反瑞士的保密法律和违反国际礼让,法院举行,它可以'命令任何一方在其管辖来作证或出示文件不管外国主权的观点相反。
在东南亚,画面复杂,情报共享与合作证明是成功的,但只有当信息不是一个性质,将挑战国家的政治统治者。二粒最近得出结论,已经成功之间Sinapore ,马来西亚和菲律宾在交换信息的背景下,特别是领导引渡程序。最近2007年4月,新加坡和印尼签署引渡条约,以便在适当的法律制度可以处理恐怖嫌疑人。然而,尽管这些例子中,东南亚国家的双边合作“抵制国内事务上共享敏感信息,可能会妨碍或挑战统治精英”的政治立场。
此外,在信息共享和相互法律协助的困难可能出现在相关国家的法律制度之间是有区别的。例如,哪些国家有没有法律互助条约与意大利黑手党罪犯往往吸引,但协议一直在黑手党的其他成员已经能够活下去,尽管存在着严重的刑事指控,其中作为被告的未决公开。
贾米森提供了一个例子,当被请求国的司法管辖区不承认意大利一个黑手党类型关联的成员罪,或在荷兰和德国,阴谋罪不存在的情况下,有一个漏洞创建。卡莫拉成员米歇尔扎扎的情况举例:扎扎在意大利自1984年以来有关他的本意是黑手党协会,以及谋杀和贩毒指控而被通缉。意大利寻求引渡他,然而,他被允许居住在法国公开(除了从服务为期两年判处走私香烟) 。事实上,它是不是直到1993年,他终于被重新逮捕并引渡到意大利,在那里他后来死在监狱。
以及更多的'纯粹的'近代相互提供法律援助的形式,训练也一直在合作的重要组成部分。彼得Gastrow ,在南非的安全和安保部部长特别顾问确定警察部队,有几个方面,包括:检测和调查方法;贩毒,机动车盗窃和走私,白领犯罪,包括从国际经验中受益洗钱和欺诈行为,官员腐败;及跨境走私军火。
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