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代写coursework,IMF World Bank
发表日期:2013-09-11 09:16:44 | 来源:assignment.cc | 当前的位置:首页 > 代写coursework > 正文
IMF World Bank
The World Bank and IMF: Advocates of Liberalization and Privatization
Topic III: Discuss the way that two or more supra-national organizations
interact to shape global policy in any one policy area.
Abstract
The World Bank (the Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund) are now regularly criticized for being unaccountable and ineffective. This article attempts to dissect the way of the Fund and the Bank to form the policy in economic context at international level, to explain its flaws and influences in many developing countries. Firstly examine the conditions that the Bank and the Fund attach to the recipient countries of their loans and financial aid. Then discusse the role of the Bank and the Fund in global economic policy making, particularly in privatization and liberalization policy. Next summarizes unfavorable consequences of such one-heal-all privatization and liberalization policy. The conclusion suggests that many conditionality, neither necessary nor desirable for the receiptors, should be diminished.
1.0 Introduction.
The functions of international institutions have greatly expanded over the past years, and their programmes and policies have affected a wider range of people, groups and organizations than before, as Woods and Narliar (2001) point out, in the 1990s, the IMF and the World Bank expanded the range of the conditionality they apply to borrowing members, including conditions on domestic governance and the institutional framework of economic policy making (ibid).
Following such fashion, this paper will, based on some former research, examine the way of these international institutions to form the policy in economic context at international level, particularly in respect of the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore, this paper will firstly take an overview of the IMF and the World Bank, especially the development of their conditionality; secondly, the exact way through which the IMF and the World Bank make the global policy in economic area will be presented; finally, some critiques of the result related to IMF and the World Bank imposing conditions to members to shape global economic policy will be summarized.
2.0 Overview of Conditionality of the World Bank and IMF.
Dreher (2002) gives some background of those IFIs, in particular IMF and the World Bank. And he thinks that attached conditionality, which now becomes very common enclosed to IFIs' financial support program, had not been considered when the IMF and the Bank were founded in Bretton Woods in 1944. The IMF was founded to provide short term balance of payments credits and stabilise the post war financial system, and the Bank should improve long term growth in its member countries.
In that research Dreher (2002) also detailed some development of the conditionality related to the financial aid program of the Fund and the Bank. According to Dell's (1981) statement cited by Dreher (2002), at the beginning of the Fund operations, its conditions mainly focus on monetary and fiscal policy, such as decreasing relative price distortion, reducing current account deficits, export promotion, increase in international reserves. In the
same paper, Dreher (2002) also cited Kapur's (et al., 1997) description about the Bank's conditions which were very similar to that of the Fund and covered deficits of public budget, credit to the private sector, currency devaluation, and reduction in the current account deficit, export promotion. It is clear that there is a huge overlap between the conditionality of the Fund and the Bank, thus they signed an agreement to redefine the main duties of them (Dreher, 2002). According to this agreement, the Fund should be responsible for exchange rates and restrictive exchange practices, temporary balance of payments disequilibria and stabilisation programmes while the Bank should generate broader development strategies and pursue project evaluations (ibid).
Gold (2001) points out that between 1969 and 1978, IMF's conditions became increasingly detailed, which focused on the expenditure limitations on government's wage bills and subsidies (cited by Dreher, 2002). Meanwhile, World Bank conditionality mainly aimed at improving management of money and credit, government expenditures and revenues, exchange rates and foreign debt (Kapur et al. 1997 cited by Dreher, 2002).
In the 1980s, deficits became a big issue, which resulted in high inflation (Ferreira and Keely 2000 cited by Dreher, 2002). During this time, conditions focused on mapping countrywide investment, enhance incentives for optimal resource allocation, developments in infrastructure, promotion of exports and reduction of protectionism (Kapur et al. 1997 cited by Dreher, 2002). Dreher (2002) also points out that between 1980 and 1984, conditions focused primarily on international trade and the fiscal sector, and then, conditions referring to the financial sector as well as privatization and institutional reforms gained importance. Since the beginning of the 1990s poverty reduction became a core element of adjustment programmes (Ferreira and Keely 2000), and gender equality is regarded as a main condition as well (Thiele and Wiebelt 2000) (cited by Dreher, 2002).
Finally Dreher (2002) thinks that both the Fund and Bank today tend to focus on continuous growth and poverty elimination in member countries. And, overall, conditions aim at reforms of the financial sector as well as privatization and restructuring of the public sector gained weight relative to exchange rate and trade liberalization (Dreher, 2002). Therefore, it is very clear that providing financial aid arrangement with specified conditions has become the main characters of IFIs' operations in their member countries. The following sector therefore will explain how these IFIs use those powerful conditions to influence economic policy making among their member countries.
3.0 The Role of the World Bank and IMF in Economic Policy Making.
The research conducted by Eurodad (2006) shows, conditionality is often simply referred to as the commitments enclosed within a loan contract that receivers of the funding have to meet. Besides, this report Eurodad (2006) also points out that in the case of the IMF, its quantitative conditions and structural conditions were imposed to its financial arrangements receivers. And Quantitative conditions impose a set of macroeconomic targets on receivers' governments; Structural conditions, on the other hand, push for institutional and legislative policy reforms, such as trade reforms, price liberalization and privatization (Eurodad, 2006).
3.1 Impacts on Privatization
According to Brune et al (2004), in the early 1980s, a wave of selling state-owned assets began to emerge in other countries after it was initiated from Britain, and IFIs may play an important role in such privatization fashion - both the IMF and the World Bank provide loans or grants to developing countries, which enclosed a series of conditions.
In Brune's (et al., 2004) point of view most of governments in developing countries often need IFIs' financial aid to maintain the economy stablisation or support the development programmes fund, conditionality may therefore generate credible commitments to the IFIs' agendas. In turn, this credibility could provide future possible investors with confidence to stimulate them to buy shares of privatized firms in countries that under aid programme from the IMF or the World Bank (Brune et al., 2004).
This paper (Brune et al., 2004), also cites Polak's (1994) idea that IMF conditionality is generally considered to be much more binding than the World Bank, and the Fund plays a pivotal role in monitoring and enforcing fulfillment, and the next tranche of loans is not released once any condition can not be met. On the other hand, the World Bank are often not set quantitative targets for its loans, and rare apply its punishment for failure (ibid). Furthermore, Brune (et al., 2004) stresses although the Fund and World Bank do not have cross-conditionality, the failure to meet a condition of single institution also will cause the default from others.
Another research by Eurodad (2006) reveals the relationship between IFIs and privatization as well. It says that there is an increasing number of privatization conditions were forced on receivers from the World Bank and IMF between 2002 and 2006. This research (Eurodad, 2006) also points out that the World Bank and the IMF often impose the similar privatization conditions. One quarter of the countries assessed in this paper (ibid) had the same privatization condition enclosed in their loans or grants provided by the Bank and the Fund, and the majority of which were related to banking privatization.
What's more, Euro dad's research in June 2006 also represents a similar fact with the findings by Brune (et al., 2004), that the Bank and Fund often work collusively, so if one institution failed to persuade a government to implement a suggested reform, the other would pick it up. It (Eurodad, 2006) presents Bangladesh as an example of the Bank's privatisation failure of Bangladesh's banks, and then became a target and underlyingaction of IMF's lending, as well.
3.2 Contribution to Liberalization.
In the paper conducted by Dreher and Boockemann in 2003, a great many of ways in which the programmes and policies of the IFIs may influence economic liberalization, have been summarised. They reher and Bookeman, 2003tate that there is a direct impact of the IMF or the World Bank from the moment a country receives their financial arrangement, because only the compliance with those imposed conditions can make countries be qualified for credit tranches.
In addition to the direct impact of conditionality, Dreher and Boockmann (2003) also point out more informal channels how the agreement of a credit programme may influence policies in recipient countries. For example:
(t)he IFIs' programmes may raise awareness about the relevance of economic imbalances and therefore help to bring about a different policy approach (Stallings 1992). They may also face social partners with the necessity to reach consensus over the measures demanded by conditionality (Venkata 1996). As a consequence, Fund and Bank may reinforce the liberal consensus in the recipient countries (Drake 1998). (Dreher and Boockmann, 2003)
Moreover, Dreher and Boockmann (2003) cited Nelson's (1990) claims as following, in almost all developing countries some senior officials have spent a period of time as staff members in the IMF, the World Bank, or a regional development bank, which also make a transfer of knowledge from creditor countries to the IFIs. In their (Dreher and Boockmann, 2003) opinion, the influence of senior officer who used to work with the IFIs could gain another leverage of the IFIs on national policies, then results in the change of attitudes and policies towards liberalization.
4.0 Unfavorable Consequences of Privatization and Liberalization Policy
In Taylor's (1997) paper, he summarizes many cases of various countries in the research conducted by Taylor himself and Pieper (1996), and suggests that attempts by the authorities to stabilize, liberalize, and privatize, could reverse, and the unfavorable consequences might lead to: Contraction, Badly unbalanced relative price structures, especially in the wake of exchange rate, Financial instability, often centered around stock markets which have been created to accompany public enterprise privatization, Visibly increased corruption unaccompanied by faster growth, Rising unemployment and (or) regressive income redistribution and deeper poverty
5.0 Conclusion.
This report examined the conditions that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) attach to the recipient countries of their loans and financial aid. Meanwhile, it also reveals that recipient countries still face an unacceptably high and increasing number of conditions in order to gain access to the World Bank and IMF financial aid arrangements. Besides existing massive administrative burden, governments suffering crisis have no other choice but to accept the IFIs' conditions, which often contribute to economic policy reforms, like trade liberalization and privatization of essential services.
However, some former researches revealed that they could also have a harmful impact on economy, resulting in some unfavorable consequences. Therefore, in the future, the IFIs should leave more right and space for receiptors to make their own policy decision, and manage their country in a realistic way rather than totally depending on empirical conditions. And all conditions which impose controversial economic policy reforms should be diminished.
References:
Boockmann, B and Dreher, A (2003) The contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to economic freedom. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 19
Brune, N., Garrett, G. and Kogut, B (2004) The International Monetary Fund and the Global Spread of Privatization. IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 51
Dell, S (1981) On Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution of IMF Conditionality. International Finance, No. 144.
Drake, P. W. (1998) The International Causes of Democratisation, 1974-1990. In: Drake, P. W., McCubbins, M. D (eds.), The Origins of Liberty; Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Dreher, A (2002). The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality. International Finance.
Ferreira, Francisco H. G and Keely, L. C. (2000) The World Bank and structural adjustment: lessons from the 1980s. In: Christopher, L. G. and Vines, D
(eds.) The World Bank - Structure and Policies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Gould, E.R. (2001) The Changing Activities of International Organizations: The
Case of the International Monetary Fund. Paper presented at the APSA 2001
Conference
Kapur, D, Lewis, J.P., Webb, R (1997), The World Bank - Its First Half Century. Brookings Institution Press, Vol. 1
Nelson, J. (1990) Conclusions. In: Nelson, J (ed.), Economic Crisis and Public Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in Less Developed Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Polak, J (1994) The World Bank and the IMF: A Changing Relationship. The World Bank. Its First Half Century. Volume 2: Perspectives, ed. by Kapur, D, Lewis, J. P., and Webb R. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
Stallings, B (1992) International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural Reform. In: S. Haggard; R. R. Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Taylor, L (1997) Editorial: The revival of the liberal creedthe IMF and the World Bank in a globalized economy. World Development, Vol.25
Taylor, L and Pieper, U(1996) Reconciling economic reform and sustainable development: Social consequences of neo-liberalism. Untied Nations Development Programme. New York: Office of Development Studies
Thiele, R, Wiebelt, M (2000), Sind die Anpassungsprogramme von IWF und
Weltbank gescheitert? Eine Bilanz der Erfahrungen von zwei Jahrzehnten, Kieler
Diskussionsbeitrge, Institut fr Weltwirtschaft Kiel.
Woods, N and Narlikar, A (2001). Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. International Social Science Journal, Vol.53
Eurodad (2006)World Bank and IMF conditionality: a development injustice. [online] Available from: http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/reports.aspx?id=454 [Accessed 22nd Dec 2007].IMF世界银行 
世界银行和国际货币基金组织:自由化和私有化的鼓吹者 
议题三:讨论的方式,两个或两个以上的超国家组织 
互动塑造全球政策中的任何一个政策领域。 
抽象 
世界银行(世行)和国际货币基金组织(IMF或基金)现在经常批评是不负责任的和无效的。本文试图剖析基金和银行的经济背景下形成的政策,在国际一级的方式,解释其缺陷和影响在许多发展中国家。首先检查的条件,银行和基金附加到他们的贷款和财政援助的受援国。然后析】主旨题世界银行和国际货币基金组织在全球经济政策制定的作用,尤其是在私有化和自由化政策。接下来总结了这样一个愈合所有私有化和自由化政策的不利后果。结论表明,许多条件限制,既无必要,也不可取为receiptors,应减少。
1.0简介。 
国际机构的职能,极大地扩大了在过去几年中,他们的方案和政策比以前的个人,团体和组织,作为伍兹和Narliar的(2001)指出,在20世纪90年代,国际货​​币基金组织(IMF)和更广泛的影响世界银行的范围扩大的条件,他们申请借款成员,包括国内治理和经济政策制定的体制框架(同上)。 
这样的时尚之后,本文将一些前人研究的基础上,研究这些国际机构的方式在国际层面的经济背景下形成的政策,特别是在国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行就。因此,本文将首先概述了国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行的发展,尤其是他们的条件,其次,确切的方式,通过它国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行的政策使全球经济区将提交最后,有关国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行的成员施加条件,塑造全球经济政策的结果将总结一些批评。 
2.0概述世界银行和国际货币基金组织的贷款条件。 
德雷尔(2002)提供了一些背景的那些国际金融机构,特别是国际货币基金组织和世界银行。他认为附加条件,现在变得很常见随附国际金融机构的财务支持计划,没有考虑当国际货币基金组织和世界银行成立于1944年布雷顿森林体系。国际货币基金组织(IMF)成立的宗旨是提供短期平衡收支学分战后金融体系的稳定,银行应改善其成员国的长远增长。 
研究,德雷尔(2002)还详细介绍了一些开发基金组织和世界银行的金融援助方案的相关条件。据戴尔(1981)陈述引德雷尔(2002),在基金业务开始,其条件主要集中在货币政策和财政政策,如降低相对价格扭曲,减少当前帐户赤字,促进出口,增加在国际储备。在 
同样的纸,德雷尔(2002)也援引卡普尔(等人,1997年)说明有关银行的条件,基金和覆盖的公共预算,私营部门的信贷,货币贬值,降低赤字非常相似经常帐赤字,促进出口。很显然,有一个巨大的条件的基金和银行之间的重叠,因此​​他们签署了一项协议,以重新界定他们的主要职责(德雷尔,2002年)。根据该协议,该基金应该是,负责汇率和限制性交换的做法,暂时的国际收支失衡和稳定计划,而银行应产生更广泛的发展战略,并追究项目评估(同上)。 
黄金(2001)指出,在1969年和1978年之间,IMF的条件变得越来越详细,专注于政府的工资法案和补贴(引德雷尔,2002)的开支限制。与此同时,世界银行的条件主要目的是提高货币和信贷,政府支出和收入,汇率和外债管理(卡普尔等1997年引德雷尔,2002)。 
在20世纪80年代,赤字成为一个大问题,这导致在高通胀(2000年费雷拉和基莉德雷尔,2002所引用)。在此期间,,集中映射全国投资的条件,提高资源优化配置,在基础设施的发展,促进出口和减少贸易保护主义(卡普尔等人的激励机制。1997年引述德雷尔,2002年)。德雷尔(2002)也指出,在1980年和1984年之间,主要集中在国际贸易和财政部门,然后,指的是金融部门以及私有化和机构改革的条件获得的重要性。自20世纪90年代开始的减贫成为调整方案的核心要素(费雷拉和基莉2000),性别平等被看作是一个主要条件(蒂勒和Wiebelt 2000)(引德雷尔,2002)。 
最后德雷尔(2002)认为,无论是基金和银行今天往往把重点放在持续增长和消除贫困的成员国。和条件,总体而言,着眼于金融部门改革以及公共部门的私有化和重组相对于汇率和贸易自由化(德雷赫,2002)体重增加。因此,它是很清楚,提供财政援助安排规定的条件在其成员国的国际金融机构的业务已成为主角。因此,下面的部门会解释这些国际金融机构如何使用这些功能强大的条件,影响其成员国之间的经济政策的制定。 
3.0世界银行和国际货币基金组织在制定经济政策的作用。 
进行的研究由EURODAD(2006年)显示,条件往往简称为接收机的资金,以满足借款合同内包围的承诺。此外,这份报告EURODAD(2006)也指出,在国际货币基金组织(IMF)的情况下,其量化的条件和结构条件强加其财务安排接收。和定量的条件接收政府的宏观经济目标,订下一套;结构条件,另一方面,推动体制和立法政策改革,如贸易改革,价格自由化和私有化(EURODAD,2006年)。 
3.1关于私有化的影响 
据布伦等人(2004年),在20世纪80年代初,出售国有资产的浪潮开始在其他国家出现后,这是从英国开始,国际金融机构可以发挥重要的作用,在这样的私有化时尚 - 国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行提供贷款或赠款的发展中国家,其中附上了一系列的条件。 
在布伦(等人,2004)的观点,大多数发展中国家的政府往往需要国际金融机构的财政援助,以保持经济的稳价或支持发展计划基金,条件可能因此产生可信的承诺,国际金融机构的议程。信誉反过来,这可能提供了未来可能出现的投资者信心,刺激他们购买私有化企业的股份,国家在国际货币基金组织或世界银行(布伦等人,2004)的援助计划。 
此纸(布伦等人,2004),也援引波拉克(1994)的想法IMF条件一般被认为是更具有约束力的比世界银行,基金起着举足轻重的作用,在履行监管和执法,并在未来贷款批不释放任何条件,一旦不能满足。另一方面,世界银行往往没有设置为其贷款的量化目标,和罕见的申请失败的惩罚(同上)。此外,布伦(等人,2004)强调,虽然基金和世界银行的没有交叉条件,不符合条件的单一机构还将导致默认从别人的。 
另一个由EURODAD(2006)的研究,揭示了国际金融机构和私有化之间的关系。它说,有越来越多的私有化条件被迫接收来自世界银行和国际货币基金组织在2002年和2006年之间。此的研究(EURODAD,2006)也指出,世界银行和国际货币基金组织(IMF)经常施加类似的私有化条件。本文中评估的国家(同上)一季度有同样的私有化条件,包含在由世界银行和国际货币基金组织提供的贷款或赠款,其中大部分为银行私有化。 
更重要的是,欧元爸爸的研究在2006年6月也表示类似布伦(等人,2004)的研究结果其实,世行和基金往往工作共谋,因此,如果一个机构未能说服实施建议的改革是政府,其他的将它捡起来。它(EURODAD,2006)提出了孟加拉国孟加拉国的银行银行的私有化失败的例子,然后成为了国际货币基金组织的贷款,以及一个的目标和underlyingaction的。 
3.2贡献自由化。 
在纸张由德雷尔和Boockemann在2003年进行了大量的国际金融机构的方案和政策可能会影响经济自由化的方式,已总结。 ,他们reher Bookeman,2003tate有直接的影响,国际货币基金组织(IMF)或世界银行的那一刻起,一个国家接受他们的财务安排,因为只有遵守这些附加条件,可以使国家信贷批合格。 
除了直接影响的条件,德雷尔和Boockmann的(2003)也指出,更加非正式的渠道,信贷计划的协议,可能会影响受援国的政策。例如: 
(T)国际金融机构的方案可能提高认识有关经济失衡的相关性,因此有助于带来一个采取不同政策的(斯托林斯1992)。他们还可能面临社会伙伴的必要性达成共识的措施所要求的条件(1996年Venkata的)。因此,基金和银行可能会在受援国加强自由主义共识(1998年德雷克)。 (德雷尔和Boockmann 2003) 
此外,德雷尔和Boockmann(2003)援引尼尔森(1990)声称后,几乎所有的发展中国家的一些高级官员已经花了一段时间,因为工作人员的国际货币基金组织,世界银行,或一家地区发展银行,这也知识转移从债权国的国际金融机构。 (德雷尔和Boockmann 2003)的意见,谁使用工作与国际金融机构的高级管理人员的影响可能获得另一个充分利用国际金融机构对国家政策,自由化的态度和政策变化的结果。 
4.0私有化和自由化政策的不利后果 
在泰勒的纸(1997)中,他总结了泰勒自己和皮珀(1996)进行的研究各国的许多案件,并建议,尝试由当局稳定,自由化和私有化,可能会逆转,和不利的后果可能严重失去平衡,导致收缩,相对价格结构,尤其是在汇率,金融不稳定,经常围绕股市已创建陪公营事业民营化,明显增强腐败孤身增长较快,失业率上升和(或唤醒)倒退的收入再分配和更深的贫困 
5.0结论。 
本报告审查的条件,世界银行和国际货币基金(IMF)附加到他们的贷款和财政援助的受援国。同时,它也表明,受援国仍然面临一个高得令人无法接受,越来越多的条件下,为了获得世界银行和国际货币基金组织的财政援助安排。除了现有的大量的行政负担患有危机,政府没有其他选择,只能接受国际金融机构的条件,这往往有助于经济政策改革,如贸易自由化和私有化的基本服务。 
然而,一些以往的研究发现,他们也可能有有害的经济影响,造成一些不利的后果。因此,在未来,国际金融机构应留出更多的权利和空间receiptors做出自己的决策,管理自己的国家,而不是完全取决于经验条件的现实途径。征收争议的经济政策改革的所有条件,应大幅度减少。 
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