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代写留学生作业,Construction Clients Olympic
发表日期:2013-09-25 14:11:28 | 来源:assignment.cc | 当前的位置:首页 > 代写留学生作业 > 正文
Construction Clients Olympic

Three different case studies namely: (1) Olympic stadium; (2) Wembley stadium; and (3) Arsenal Emirates stadium have been specifically chosen to critically analyse different psyches and make ups of construction clients as well as the procurement routes discussed in previous chapters. The evaluation seeks to find out how the construction clients have influenced the delivery of projects; how the construction client have adhered to the recommendations of the government and industry's reports and how the adopted procurement routes have helped in improving the UK construction industry performance.

This chapter basically relies on the issues discussed in preceding chapters in critically appraising the way the projects procurements were carried out. The author's commentaries have been given in green while the case studies notes predominantly obtained through the internet are given in the normal black.

CASE STUDY 1: THE LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC STADIUM

All the case study materials for the Olympics stadium were obtained from only one source which is the internet.

The Project

The Olympic stadium is a project that is part of an intricate Olympic programme which is embodied by a compulsory timetable and programme of works that affects the development of each of the facilities that makes up the Olympic programme.

The delivery of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympics games facilities is regarded as the biggest and most intricate project embarked on in the UK for a very long time (MPA, 2006). The site for the Olympics will be Europe's largest regeneration project (LSC, 2007). The hub essence of the project is the development of facilities for the games as well as the regeneration of the section of eastern part of the capital city, London (BBC, 2008a). According to WLB (2006), the development of the Olympic facilities and their legacy transformation includes (1) five permanent venues construction namely- Olympic Stadium, Aquatic Centre, Velopark, Handball Arena and Eton Arena; (2) three temporary sporting venues (Basketball Arena, Hockey and Fencing Venues); (3) International Broadcast Centre/Main Press Centre construction; (4) permanent and temporary structures, roads and bridges; (5) site-wide utilities infrastructure; earthwork and extensive landscaping; and (6) extensive post games legacy regeneration works.

The Olympic stadium brief was drafted to produce an amazing 80,000-seater stadium for the hosting of the track and field events as well as the opening and closing ceremonies for both the Olympic and Paralympics games (WLB, 2006). After the games it would be demounted or perhaps reduced to 25,000 seats, but still retains the maintainable and rational capacity of hosting ranges of sporting, educational, cultural and community events with athletics being its core use (WLB, 2006a). The knack of conversion of the stadium from an 80,000-seater venue to a 25,000-seater venue with 55,000 demounted immediately the Olympics ends is regarded as highly innovative and espouses great forward thinking (BBC, 2008a).

The 拢496 million Olympic stadium design is motivated by a commitment made during London's bid to bequeath a world class athletics legacy rather than a succession of flamboyant edifice as exemplified in previous Olympics (Guardian, 2008). While considering how to reduce and come up with a reasonable cost and make the demounting of the stadium (as outlined in the project brief and shown in Fig 5.2a) less complicated, the majority of the services usually found within the stadium such as catering, bars, toilets and merchandise stalls was designed to be located in "pods" on the forecourt outside the stadium (Guardian, 2008).

According to BBC (2008a) the main features of the design are (1) a sunken bowl built into the ground for the field of play and lower permanent seating, designed to bring spectators close to the action;(2) 25,000 permanent seats + 55,000 demountable; (3) a cable-supported roof that will stretch 28 metres the whole way around the stadium, providing cover for two-thirds of spectators; (3) a fabric curtain will wrap around the stadium structure, acting as additional protection and shelter for spectators; and (4) facilities such as catering and merchandising will be grouped into self-contained 'pod' structures.

The Olympics Minister, Tessa Jowell MP in her words extols the virtues of the concept and stated that "Once the Games are over this will then be translated into a stadium that will not only host grand prix athletics events and other national sport events but will also serve the communities of the boroughs" (BBC, 2008a). After completion the stadium will supplement and complements other grand stadia around London such as Wembley, the Emirates and the Twickenham stadia (BBC, 2008a).

The Client

The Olympic programme involves a complex array of 5 key stakeholders (MPA, 2006) as shown in Fig. 5.2c and bidding for the Olympic has to be in conformation with the International Olympic Committees' (IOC) guidelines (Guardian, 2008b). The Olympic board comprises of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London, Lord Moynihan, Lord Coe and Jack Lemley (MPA, 2006). The first two people mentioned chair the board alternatively while the rest of the board acts in advisory capacity (MPA, 2006).

The Olympic Board Steering Group (OBSG) comprises of senior officials of the 5 key stakeholders namely: (1) ODA; (2) the London Organising Committee of the Olympics Games (LOCOG); (3) the Greater London Authority (GLA); (4) British Olympic Association (BOA); and (5) the Government (MPA, 2006). Their main functions are to collectively advice and provide assurance to the board (MPA, 2006). These stakeholders have differing perceptions as to what constitute success. While they all have different responsibilities towards the success of the game, their individual objectives has to be met. It is worth noting that their varying objectives were well reconciled as per the game. Shared understanding was created among them and reconciliation of objectives was easy because one of the predominant overarching aims of both the UK government and IOC for the games is sustainability. As discussed earlier in chapter 4, the Egan report recommends sustainability which is in consonance with the stadium construction aims.

 

IOC parameters stipulates that the construction costs had to be given in prices in the year of the bidding (2004) rather than the likely overall costs in hosting year of 2012 (Guardian, 2008b). This led to the 拢280 million bid book price to the IOC (Guardian, 2008b). It augurs that prices had to be going up constantly due the inflation in the UK construction industry which ran at 6.5% as at late 2007 (Guardian, 2008b). The issue of the under budgeting which created widespread criticism was partly as a result of the IOC's strict guidelines of presenting costing within a certain parameters. The inflation in the construction industry is currently running on close to 7% as against a lower one in 2004 when the estimate was made. The IOC ought to have considered economic terms and allowed for future prices to be made as in most accounting future predictions. It is rather surprising and somewhat disheartening to note that IOC had to wait this long to change the negative presentation of using bidding year costing as the actual cost of stadium to be built in 8years time!. With prevailing interest rates which tends to force cost escalation gave the public negative opinion and views with cost rising up to 100% increase!

The demounting cost of the stadium as well as value added tax (VAT) were not included in the initial 拢280 million cost submitted to IOC which meant the venue was always going to cost more than originally figured (Guardian, 2008b). The brief was hurriedly made which never tallied with the tactical issues of the whole concept. The author reckons that there was no comprehensive one at the time! The strategic issues and the tactical issues were not in unison because of the prevalent atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding winning the bid. Irrespective of the chosen procurement routes, changes in brief will definitely lead to changes in cost. Moreover, while offering plausible reasons for the demounting and being optimistic of a possible buyer of the demountable parts, it is still seen that finding a possible buyer could be onerous or perhaps impossible. Designs and technology change rapidly and likewise innovations which tends to leads to changes in materials. Today's innovation can be tomorrow's error!

The vision and strategic objectives are well spelt out. According to MPA (2006) the vision is "To host an inspirational, safe and inclusive Olympic and Paralympics games and leave a sustainable legacy for London and the UK".

As shown in the Fig. 5.2c above, the ODA is the public body responsible for the development and construction of all the new venues and infrastructure for the Games and thus represents the clients on the project (MPA, 2006). The ODA was considered to be a comparatively small organization structure and an industry representative called the private delivery partner was chosen to take up the balance of the mishmash of resources provision and management (MPA, 2006). CLM was however chosen as the private delivery partner. Though they are knowledgeable and experience client, as discussed in chapter 2, they still engage external expertise to augment their in-house assemblage. This was a smart approach in the right direction considering the magnitude of the project at hand.

The CLM is a consortium of Laing O Rourke Plc, Mace Ltd and CH2M Hill and was appointed to work with the ODA to project manage the venues and infrastructure programme for the games. Their functions include the integration of design, construction, commissioning, procurement, scheduling and cost management (MPA, 2006). The consortium signed performance based contract where profit will be earned if targets are met thus making it a reward structure linked with delivery.

5.2.3 The Analysis of the Procurement Process

ODA launched a procurement policy that highlights both high quality and value for money as core values for procuring contracts聽for all the聽2012 Games venues and infrastructural developments (WLB, 2006b). ODA chose a competitive process to procure an Integrated Design and Construct Team for the design and construction of the Olympic stadium so as to ensure top quality design, construction and completion, commissioning, testing and licensing of the stadium for the Games (Creative Match, 2006).

The procurement policy has themes such as security measures, sustainability and legacy and thus allows all businesses bidding for contracts to be rated according to a balanced scorecard (WLB, 2006b). The policy is expected to result in an excellent working relationship with shared values and objectives of sustainability and lasting legacy with the best of businesses and companies found in the UK construction industry (WLB, 2006b). It is envisaged that the successful bidder must have an innovative design flair, capacity, experience, technical expertise, financial and economic strength (Creative Match, 2006). This was successfully achieved through the appointment of the preferred bidder.

The ODA preferred tendering option was the Electronic tendering (E-tendering), a two stage competitive process which allows companies to take part in tenders in a secured and efficient way (WLB, 2006a). In consonance with the EU guidelines (WLB, 2006a), 7 national and international applications/bids were received to pre-qualify for the contract (NAO, 2008). Consequently, in compliance with the public contracts regulations, ODA sets prequalification criteria which were only met by Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd submission (WLB, 2006a) and was considered both viable and compliant with requirements (NAO, 2008). It is however worth noting that competition was not keen because of the progress of only one successful tenderer to the next stage. The use of two stage tendering is to give chance for competition which never materialised. To the authors' consternation it is a shame to the industry. The Australian company, Multiplex would have provided a stiff competition to Sir McAlpine had they successfully executed the Wembley national stadium project.

Moreover, negotiations started between ODA and Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which is legally binding was signed to both design and build the Olympic stadium (WLB, 2006a). To the dismay of ODA, a particular bidder team was without a construction contractor despite the core requirement for an integrated design and build bid (NAO, 2008). Again, this is a shame to the UK construction industry which produces 6% of the nation GDP. The action does not exemplify professionalism. The integrated design and construction approach will reduce risk and potential cost overruns (Creative Match, 2006). However, as it turned out an additional 拢29 million pounds which translates to 拢525 million is expected to be the potential final cost! ODA reckons that the lackadaisical interest was as a result of the risk perception of high profile stadium project in the UK public sector and also the advance knowledge that Team Stadium was also a bidder (NAO, 2008). However, due to the failure of other bidders, ODA entered into a single tender basis with Team Stadium (NAO, 2008). The failure of Multiplex to produce a successful Wembley stadium resulted in its non consideration.

The MoU entails the key commercial terms which created the basis of the full integrated design and build contract and records the terms on which the contractor agreed for further design development before the signing of full contract (WLB, 2006a). Considerable design and value engineering was carried out on the project and the signing of the MoU allowed the development of design which necessitated the early procurement of commodities such as steel needed to build the Stadium (London2012, 2007). It is worth giving kudos here that, as observed in chapters 3 and 4, one of the averred recommendations of the government and industry reports is the early supply chain assemblage. Also, the use of value management in removing unnecessary design and cost as discussed in chapter 4, which is a key theme in NAO modernising construction report of 2001, is a welcome adherence.

The Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and their designers are known as the Team Stadium (WLB, 2006a). According to WLB (2006a) the Team Stadium comprises of: (1) Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd (Construction contractor); (2) HOK Sport Ltd (Architect and Sport venue designer); and (3) Buro Happold Ltd (Structural and services engineers) (WLB, 2006a). The three companies have at different times worked together on different projects namely: (1) Arsenal stadium (Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, Buro Happold Ltd and HOK Sport Ltd; (2) ExCeL Exhibition Centre (Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and Buro Happold Ltd); and (3) The Eden project (Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd and Buro Happold Ltd). This demonstrates integration of supply chain, long term relationship and collaborative workings as dictated in all the previous chapters.

Consequently, a design and build contract was signed with the Team Stadium on 17 March 2008 (NAO, 2008). This demonstrates single point responsibility and adherence to government directives of 3 effective procurement routes that exemplifies value for money as observed in chapter 2 and 3. A forecast of potential cost of 拢525 million was envisaged in March 2008 which reflects the uncompetitiveness of the procurement process and the changes in the design and scope requirements as a result of roof amendment (NAO, 2008). Therefore, 拢525 million stands as the potential final cost and 拢496 million as the budget (NAO, 2008). This is common to all design and build route and its variants as discussed in chapter two. Design changes and variations are costly.

5.2.4 Lessons Learnt

It is still premature to ascribe failure to the Olympic stadium because of the besmirched and unpleasant information available to the public. With cost also escalating every seconds of the day, these has eroded the mind of the public and cast bad impression about the stadium success. Most messy projects always have time and cost overrun attached to them which always leads to adversarialism. When a project involves multiple stakeholders with little time to bid for the Olympics, there are bound to be hurried assembly of bids which might not be absolutely impeccable. This indicates that lesson should always be learnt from the limitation of previously held Olympics. The IOC has taken a wonderful timely reversion of presenting bid costs in the year of hosting rather than in the year of bidding which is a welcome action.

Smart approaches are been taken to erase the bad impression and re-create public confidence. The time table have been reset with the project starting three months ahead of schedule which is hoped to make the stadium available before the scheduled time. Also, the early assembling of the teams is really helping the progress of the project.

The procurement policy which is in consonance with the stakeholders objectives of sustainability and legacy derivation is seen to be a right move in the right direction. It has resulted in excellent working arrangement of the assembled team. Moreover, it is worth acknowledging that any endeavour that is worth doing should be done well. The Sir McAlpines' past achievement record was the overarching consideration of their success, while Multiplex shame delivery of the Wembley hindered them from even tendering for the project.

The design and build can be seen to be the right route for the stadium delivery. While its limitation of not been so good in quality can be enhanced by close monitoring of project managers, its time and cost certainty for the stadium delivery is a forte attached to it which is most important for the stadium delivery.

CASE STUDY 2: THE WEMBLEY NATIONAL STADIUM

The Project

There is the worldwide believe that the Wembley national stadium has always had an exceptional place in the annals of the UK as an event and entertainment centre (Quintain, 2004). During the late 20th century, the Wembley national stadium hosted series of major park, theatre and funfair events such as the 1924 British Empire Exhibition, the 1934 Empire Games, the 1948 Summer Olympics, the 1996 World Cup Finals, the 1978 Eurovision Song Contest, the 1996 European Championships and several other events staged in between (Quintain, 2004).

The stadium was demolished in 2002 and rebuilt in 2006 to a 90,000-seater stadium (WNSL, 2008). The new 拢757 million Wembley national stadium (NAO, 2003) is now almost thrice as large as its former size with its arch positioning 140 metres beyond its concourse, which is considered enormous enough to roll the London eye beneath!(Quintain, 2004). Though the arch replaced the twin towers which were the stadium's symbol, the Wembley national stadium is still considered as an icon just as the old Wembley stadium (SPG, 2008a). Though controversy trailed the demolition of the iconic twin towers, but it is worth giving kudos for the eventual settlement of the uproar with the impeccable choice of the arch.

The project was triggered in 1996, by the clamour for a new English national stadium and consequently after national competition, Sport England overwhelmly selected Wembley as the preferred site (House of Commons, 2004). Sport England overarching objective was support the development of an iconic stadium for three major sports namely football, rugby league and athletics (NAO, 2003).

The principal uses of the Wembley national stadium are football and rugby league (NAO, 2003). It is mandated that after five years of the stadium's operation, 1% of its annual turnover will be donated by WNSL for the delivery to sports education and other projects (NAO, 2003).

The Client

The Football Association (FA) was at the forefront of the stadium project and the stadium was eventually brought to life by its subsidiary, WNSL (House of Commons, 2004). WNSL was responsible for its construction and consequently charged with operating and owning the new stadium (NAO, 2003). The Wembley National Stadium project was wholly undertaken by private sector organisations and was mostly financed by private capital (NAO, 2003).

The public sector contribution towards the construction of the stadium was 拢161 million with the breakdown of: (1) 拢120 million from Sport England; (2) 拢20 million from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS); and (3) 拢21 million from the London Development Agency (NAO, 2003). The full contributions of the key stakeholders (both the public and private sectors) and the various uses of the funds are as shown in Fig. 5.3b and 5.3c respectively.

Profits generated from the operation of the Wembley National Stadium are used by the FA for the benefit of football (NAO, 2003). The issue of track inclusion in the design created a bit of acrimony between Sport England (SE) and WNSL (House of Commons, 2004). However, it was later decided that athletics consideration (track) should be withdrawn which SE was persuaded to accept unwillingly (NAO, 2003). This act is seen to be unfair. As one of the key stakeholders a meeting ought to be called and sought the view of SE before taking any decision. Perhaps value management exercise ought to have been carried out as discussed in one of the industry report and all the stakeholders especially SE would have a shared understanding as to why the track is to be removed.

The Analysis of the Procurement Process

On 14th July 1999, WNSL threw open bids submission for contractors for the Wembley national stadium (Building, 2008). Mowlem, HBG, Sir Robert McAlpine and Bovis/Multiplex were the companies that responded to the invitation (Building, 2008). In early 2002, Cyril Sweett was hired by WNSL as the independent consultants and the firm consequently gave Multiplex contract a clean sheet as providing value for money (SPG, 2008a). Initially, Multiplex was agreed as the preferred contractor on a guaranteed maximum price (GMP) design and build contract of 拢326.5m (which does not include design fees) with a 31/4-year programme to construct the Wembley stadium (Building, 2008). The Wembley National Stadium project was completed in 2007 at an amazingly high cost of 拢757 million (House of Commons, 2004) with the stadium eventually gulping 拢445 million (NAO, 2003). The project overran on time and cost.

The design of the stadium was carried out by architects Foster and Partners and HOK Sport while Sir Norman Foster designed the arch and the roof structure (SPG, 2008a). According to Building (2008) the tendering process started with the appointment of Bovis/Multiplex consortium in 2000 as the preferred contractor which was later dissolved and Multiplex was appointed. Bovis opted out when it envisaged that the agreed price was not tenable or visible (Building, 2008). This was the genesis of the stadium's problem. As a deeply rooted company in the UK, Bovis understood very clearly that construction was not visible at that cost. However, owing to the plausible smart play of WNSL and the ubiquities of mischief associated with the design and construct route were contractors bid low in order to wait for claims and variations to improve their profit. WNSL fell for the trap and an agreement was signed. But this turned out to be adversarial leading to numerous accusation and court cases. Moreover, Tropus was first appointed as Wembley project manager whose contract ran out and was consequently replaced by Symonds (Building, 2008).

Due to the clamour in 1996 for a national stadium, Wembley was consequently chosen as the preferred site (House of Commons, 2004). Two years later, SE awarded 拢120 million towards the development of the project (House of Commons, 2004). It was however envisaged in 1998 that the construction cost would be in the region of 拢320 million and to be completed within 4 years (House of Commons, 2004).

However, in year 2000 the project suffered financial setback and a request for additional public fund was initiated by the FA in 2001, but the Secretary of State for Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) declined and asked Mr Patrick Carter to review the project (House of Commons, 2004). A staggering sum of 拢1.6 million was squandered in reviewing the project (House of Commons, 2004). From the author's viewpoint, expending such an amount of money in reviewing does not exemplify value for money. A report from Tropus should have been taken serious and re-tendering ordered instead of spending the money on reviewing and coming out with little effective report.

It was noted during the course of the review, that there was lapses on the project by WNSL and DCMS was also cognisant of concerns about features of the management such as the procurement process which resulted in the appointment of Multiplex as the main contractor to build the stadium (House of Commons, 2004).

This concerns led to its investigation by Mr David James CBE stemming from the request of the then Chairman of Wembley National Stadium Limited (House of Commons, 2004). While no speck of evidence of impropriety was found, serious concerns were raised as to whether equal opportunity was granted to all the bidders (House of Commons, 2004). A conclusion was however reached that the procurement process did not meet the highest standards expected in the industry (House of Commons, 2004). It was noted that a comprehensive formal procurement process was not enacted by WNSL and it was also seen that for the award of the same contract, they ran two separate corresponding tendering processes on dissimilar terms (House of Commons, 2004). To buttress the non enforcement of level playing ground, it was also noted that they had dialogue with Multiplex before the commencement of the formal procurement process (House of Commons, 2004). As a client of the construction industry, the action is seen to be against best practice. As an industry seen to be besmirched with image problem, a favourable and fair level playing ground is expected to be provided by the construction client for active involvement of all and sundry.

It was therefore concluded by the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport that the availability of further public funding would be hinged on meeting series of tests by both the FA and WNSL (House of Commons, 2004). However, these tests were later met and the project was considered commendable of further support (House of Commons, 2004).

DCMS thought of re-tendering the construction contract as a condition of further support was discarded on the ground that no likelihood of savings to the public purse would be achieved (House of Commons, 2004). This was a wise decision considering that 拢1.6 million has been expended on review and more time might be wasted in re-tendering.

Two reports were published by Tropus and James and they both concluded that WNSL never followed best practice thereby bereft of best value (Building, 2008). It was however argued that players in the UK industry were not given ample chance to compete for the project (Building, 2008).

The arch construction started in 2003 and its fabrication was done on-site using steel modules manufactured by steel subcontractor Cleveland Bridge. However, irreconcilable differences erupted between Cleveland Bridge and Multiplex and the former had to leave the project and was replaced by another steel subcontractor called Hollandia (SPG, 2008a). Cleveland Bridge was unsure if they would be paid for the materials to be employed (SPG, 2008a). This later resulted into a court case (SPG, 2008a). This reinforced the issue of long time relationship and effective supply chain integration as discussed earlier in previous chapters. The author reckons that Bovis/Multiplex consortium would have provided strong supply chain ties needed for success. Bovis is a deeply rooted company that understands the UK industry and has a strong supply chain leaning unlike the Australian company. While accepting the EU directives, it is also more important to look at the antecedence of magnitude of projects executed by the company in the country under consideration. If there had been strong supply chain ties between Multiplex and its steel sub-contractor, the issue of distrust of payment would never have arose.

Lessons Learnt

The design and build and its various variants are expected to be produce cost and time certainty which were never on the Wembley stadium. The novated design and build which was employed on the case study was expected to allow the client the opportunity to have great input into the design before novating the designer to the contractor after output specification would have been fully specified. From the case study, the GMP novated Design and Build contract was hurriedly assembled by WNSL without fully establishing its requirement. This is considered inappropriate and as discussed in previous chapters, can lead to adversarialism. Consequently, the project was characterised with numerous court cases.

It was also noted that the project was full of adversarial relationship both on the sides of the client and contractor and the contractor and sub-contractor. All the benchmark reports as discussed in chapter four advocated for long term relationship and effective supply chain management. Knowledge of UK construction industry terrain is very essential which as noted in the case study was not quite and fully understand by Multiplex. WNSL too never made matter easy by allowing Bovis to walk out of the process and rushing into agreement with only the Australian company. As noted in the case study, Multiplex is partially or perhaps bereft of the modus operandi of the UK construction industry and the author reckons that was why multiplex entered into a consortium with Bovis. However, WNSL action and consideration of multiplex could be seen to be based on price alone and perhaps very low cost consideration which is not in consonance with best practise. Strong and effective supply chain was devoid in the project leading to massive rift between the supply chain due to lack of long term relationship.

As noted in case study one of the Olympic stadium, Multiplex image has been besmirched by its unsuccessful execution of the Wembley national stadium. It can be concluded that for a construction company continued existence and progress in the volatile UK construction industry, successful and unsuccessful past project execution will surely play significant role in its successful bidding for project.

Lastly, the project was seen to lack effective stakeholders management. Due consideration needs to be given to all stakeholders before changing any aspect of the project. Effective and timely consideration needs to be the watchword.

CASE STUDY 3: THE ARSENAL EMIRATES STADIUM

The Project

The Emirates stadium is a 60,000-seater stadium constructed in Ashburton Grove as a replacement for the Highbury stadium which was the former ground (SPG, 2008b). The Emirates stadium is the home of premier league Football Club called Arsenal.

Announcement was made in late 2004 that the new stadium would be known as the Emirates stadium after a sponsorship deal of 拢100 million was struck with Emirates Airline (SPG, 2008b). The stadium will be known as Emirates stadium for at least for the first 15 years of the stadium's operations (SPG, 2008b). Commencing from 2006/07 football season, payments for an 8year shirt sponsorship was also agreed on which was included in the 拢100 million deal (SPG, 2008b).

Ashburton Grove is very close to Highbury (SPG, 2008b). Several options were looked at including Wembley stadium before settling for Ashburton Grove which it has long been known with for an upward of 90years (SPG, 2008b; Arsenal, 2008). This is in line with the clients' objective of maintaining close ties with the area (SPG, 2008b).

Moreover, sustainability was a special consideration in its design and in its housing development, BREEAM Eco Homes standards were its overarching yardstick (SPG, 2008b). This is seen to be in line with the industry benchmark report which recommends sustainability. The project also includes housing development and waste recycling centre (SPG, 2008b).

The Client

The construction of a 拢390 million modern stadium together with a new waste recycling centre and the impeccable business relocation was the overarching aim of Arsenal football club (Arsenal, 2008).

For the successful delivery of the project, a subsidiary of Arsenal Holdings plc called Ashburton Properties was formed and 拢260 million senior loan facility was secured from a banking group that finance stadium facilities (SPG, 2008b).

The banking group is made up of: (1) the Royal Bank of Scotland PLC; (2) Espirito Santo Investment; (3) The Bank of Ireland; (4) Allied Irish Banks PLC; (5) CIT Group Structured Finance (UK) Limited; and (6) HSH Nordbank AG (SPG, 2008b). The remaining funds for the execution of the project came from Arsenal Football Club through funds from Granada, Nike and the cash realised from the sale of surplus land assets in connection with the stadium site for new housing development (SPG, 2008b). Delaware North catering firm financed the stadium's catering facilities through 拢15 million with the exclusive right to be in charge of the stadium's catering operation (SPG, 2008b). While there were bit of hitches in planning and funding arrangement, the funding was still well secured ahead of time with well defined and established clients objectives. This make up exemplifies a perfect privately run project with a well defined objectives as shall be seen in the subsequent section.

The Analysis of the Procurement Process

In 2001, the stadium scheme design was unveiled and Sir Robert McAlpines' bid was successful and accepted as the main contractor for the stadium the following year (Liddell, 2006). Two stage tendering was employed for the tendering process and initially both lump sum and fixed percentage for the contractor's preliminaries and the latter for profit and overheads was used (Liddell, 2006). However, when an agreement was reached on works packages allowances, a conversion was consequently made to a GMP (Liddell, 2006). This was a smart decision on the part of the contractor to have certainty on cost before getting involved with the GMP because lots of work package contracts are involved for the stadium as well as the waste recycling centre (Liddell, 2006). As a result, all the work package contractors were involved in the design to improve buildability (Liddell, 2006). The stadium was delivered within budget and two weeks before deadline (Liddell, 2006). Unlike in the Wembley case of Multiplex, Sir McAlpines' experience of the UK construction industry is vast. The contractor fully understands what it takes to deliver a successful project. The contractor knows where adversarial relationship can erupt and took smart approaches in dealing with them before agreeing on the GMP contract. The effective use of two stage tendering will always leads to value for me for the client and allows the contractor to full share its understanding of what is value to the client.

In the words of the Sir Robert McAlpines' director Vince Corrigan and project manager Andrew Veness, the project faced several challenges such as: (1) Occupation of the site by local businesses; (2) Railway lines are sideways of the site; (3) delivery must be before the commencement of the 2006/07 season; and (4) interruption of works for 9month for sorting out of planning and funding issues (Exceptional Performers, 2007). However, against all these odds the project was successfully delivered by the contractor. As noted in the case study below, early engagement of contractor and effective and selective supply chain are key to success.

Moreover, several reasons were adduced for the successful delivery of the stadium but the most overarching and notable of the reasons was the effective and selective supply chain created by the main contractor (Exceptional Performer, 2007). It was noted that the early engagement of sub-contractors that Sir Robert McAlpine have established long term relationship with was the magic (Exceptional Performer, 2007). This was an epitome of trust, communication and empowerment (Exceptional Performer, 2007). The project was seen to be devoid of formal dispute as a result of established trust from the inception of the project (Exceptional Performer, 2007). The effective process of contract, programming and planning systems and processes, prompt meetings and the excellent client attitude were the magic behind the successful delivery of the project (Exceptional Performer, 2007). The stadium was delivered in conjunction with HOK sport and Buro Happold (Arsenal, 2008). As discussed in preceding chapters, trust plays massive role in the successful delivery of project. In the case study of Wembley national stadium, Multiplex and its steel sub-contractor never established trust. There was no long term relationship between the two to provide the trust needed. And as noted this led to various court cases. This case study epitomizes best practice in action. The built stadium came out with top quality and devoid of time and cost overruns. It was noted that effectively delivering a project will certainly increase the chance of been ranked and consequently securing more projects. This was well visible in the ODA consideration of Sir McAlpines' declaration as the best contractor to deliver the Olympics stadium. While there was uproar against the successful delivery of the Olympic stadium, the choice of Sir McAlpines has doused the apprehension.

5.4.4 Lessons Learnt

This case study has shown that "good wine needs no bush". It is what is sown that would surely be reaped. The client took smart approach in setting its objectives and output specification before involving the main contractor. And equally, the main contractor took smart approaches in its dealing with the client and the sub-contractor.

Employing a contractor that understands the UK construction industry terrain plays a long way in the successful delivery of projects. The possession of effective supply chain and established long term relationship also played significant role in the successful delivery of the stadium. Trust which is seen to be a scarce commodity in the UK construction industry was also a magic in the Emirates stadium successful delivery. This case study has therefore demonstrated that trust should not be a scarce commodity if a client can specify its output specification and objectives at the outset of the project before engaging the main contractor. Equally, engaging a contractor with UK strong ties is very essential. Effective and selective supply chain advocated by all the government and industry's benchmark reports can be seen to be justifiable from this case study.

CONCLUSIONS

Best and bad practices have been showcased by the case studies analysed. The case studies were diligently chosen to highlight the extent to which construction projects outcomes can be influenced by the construction clients irrespective of the chosen procurement route. As highlighted in the case studies, each of the case studies have different stakeholders make up. The Olympic stadium stakeholders were seen to be public sector construction clients that even transcends beyond a particular country to a body standing for the whole world. The Wembley stadium stakeholders on the other hand, were seen to be a mishmash of both the private and public sector clients. However, the Emirates stadium stakeholders were predominantly private sector client.

While all the case studies employed the same procurement route with different variants to allow for more clients' involvement and input into design, they still all came out with different outcomes. The case studies have shown to some extent that it is not the chosen routes that are unfavourable to the projects but the leader and the parties involved that to a large extent determine the successful delivery of the projects. Though the Olympic stadium is still ongoing, it can be seen that the clients involved have really responded to the call of the industry despite the shaky start of the project. Sustainability, value for money procurement route, use of project manager to shore up knowledge base and early involvement of integrated supply chain were noticeable in the Olympic stadium project. However, the Wembley stadium was seen to epitomise bad practice. The project was fraught with adversarialism, acceptance of low cost tendering, partiality in tendering and non effective supply chain integration. On the other hand, the Emirates stadium was an impeccable example of best practice. Sustainability, collaborative working, effective and selective integrated supply chain management and early contractor involvement were the project ingredients. The project was efficiently executed, devoid of adversarialism and came out within budget and even before the agreed time.

Consequently, it can be concluded that the success of a construction project lies to a greater extent in the hands of the construction clients. For effective adoption of a procurement route to provide integrated working and successful outcome, the construction client attitude towards contractor selection and contractor's freedom of presenting what is good practice are paramount. Design and build procurement route is an impeccable and wonderful option that offers value for money as espoused by the benchmark report but depends largely on how it is implemented. The construction clients still need to embrace the call for leading and positively holding the baton of change in the UK construction industry. Long term collaborative working, integrated supply chain and effective communication down the supply chain are the essential recipe for success.

5.6 REFERENCES

Arsenal (2008) Emirates Stadium [online]. [Accessed on 5th August 2008 at 23.58hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.arsenal.com/emiratesstadium/article.asp?article=373175

British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC (2008a) London Unveils 2012 Stadium Plan [online]. [Accessed on 26th July 2008 at 17.25hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/olympics_2012/7081346.stm

Building (2008) Tropus denies sour grapes claims over Wembley report [online]. [Accessed on 31st July 2008 at 00.54hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.building.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=1018827

Creative Match (2006) Olympic design and construction team needed to build 2012 stadium[online]. [Accessed on 28th July 2008 at 03.24hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.creativematch.co.uk/viewnews/?92600

Dezeen (2008) Wembley Stadium by Foster + Partners [online]. [Accessed on 30th July 2008 at 11.03hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.dezeen.com/2007/05/21/wembley-stadium-by-foster-partners/

Exceptional Performers (2007) Relationships key to success of Emirates Stadium for Sir Robert McAlpine [online]. [Accessed on 31st July 2008 at 03.34hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.exceptionalperformers.com/general/relationships-key-to-success-of-emirates-stadium-for-sir-robert-mca.html

Guardian (2008a) Plain and Practical is the aim as London Unveils its 2012 Stadium [online]. [Accessed on 27th July 2008 at 19.34hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/nov/08/olympics2012.olympics2012

Guardian (2008b) New 2012 row as bill for Olympics Stadium nears 拢500m [online]. [Accessed on 28th July 2008 at 03.08hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/26/politics.communities

House of Commons (2004) The English national stadium project at Wembley, Eighth Report of Session 2003鈥04 [online]. [Accessed on 30th July 2008 at 21.54hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm

Learning and Skills Council, LSC (2007) PM announces skills initiatives to regenerate Thames Gateway Olympic site to be a National Skills Academy for Construction [online]. [Accessed on 27th July 2008 at 19.47hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: readingroom.lsc.gov.uk/lsc/London/070029PMThamesGateway30.11.07.pdf

Liddell, I (2006) Pitch Perfect: The construction of the New Arsenal Emirates Stadium, Article [online]. [Accessed on 28th July 2008 at 03.08hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.ingenia.org.uk/ingenia/articles.aspx?Index=385

London2012 (2007a) Next step for Olympic Stadium [online]. [Accessed on 28th July 2008 at 00.47hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.london2012.com/news/archive/2007-07/next-step-for-olympic-stadium.php

London2012 (2007b) The Olympic Delivery Authority [online]. [Accessed on 28th July 2008 at 04.22hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.london-2012.co.uk/ODA/

Major Projects Association, MPA (2006) The London Games 鈥 Managing Delivery [online]. [Accessed on 26th July 2008 at 20.41hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.majorprojects.org/pubdoc/737.pdf

National Audit Office, NAO (2008) Preparations for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympics Games: Progress Report June 2008 [online]. [Accessed on 28th July 2008 at 01.26hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/07-08/0708490.pdf

National Audit Office, NAO (2003) The English national stadium project at Wembley [online]. [Accessed on 30th July 2008 at 20.33hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/0203699.pdf

Quintain (2004) Quintain Scores Regeneration Goal at Wembley [online]. [Accessed on 30thJuly 2008 at 18.24hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.new-wembley.com/WembleyregenerationbyQuint.doc

RICS (2008) RICS Inclusive Environment Conference: Emirates Stadium, London [online]. [Accessed on 27th July 2008 at 17.47hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: www.rics.org/events

SPG (2008a) Wembley Stadium, London, United Kingdom [online]. [Accessed on 3rd July 2008 at 20.54hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.designbuild-network.com/projects/wembley/

SPG (2008b) Ashburton Grove Football Stadium, London, United Kingdom [online]. [Accessed on 3rd July 2008 at 23.22hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.designbuild-network.com/projects/ashburton/

West London Business, WLB (2006a) Olympic Stadium progress as Memorandum of Understanding is signed [online]. [Accessed on 26th July 2008 at 17.47hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.westlondon.com/sport_article.asp?id=46&archiveYear=2007

West London Business, WLB (2006b) ODA launches procurement policy [online]. [Accessed on 26th July 2008 at 19.47hrs]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.westlondon.com/sport_article.asp?id=17&archiveYear=2007

 

三个不同的案例研究,即: ( 1 )奥林匹克体育场(2)温布利体育场和(3)阿森纳酋长球场已经专门选择批判性地分析不同的灵媒和建设客户以及使UPS的采购路线在前面的章节中讨论。评估旨在找出如何建设客户影响项目交付建设单位如何遵守政府和行业报告的建议,以及如何通过采购航线有助于提高英国建筑业表现。
本章主要依赖于所讨论的问题在前面的章节中的批判性评价的方式进行项目采购。作者的评论已获得绿色,而案例研究指出主要通过互联网获得的是在正常的黑色。
案例一: 2012年伦敦奥林匹克体育场
所有个案研究资料取自奥林匹克体育场只有一个来源是互联网。
项目
奥林匹克体育场是一个项目,是一个复杂的奥运节目,这是一个强制性的作品,影响了发展的每一个设施,使奥运节目时间表和所体现的一部分。
被视为最大和最复杂的项目,走上很长一段时间( MPA ,2006)在英国伦敦2012年奥运会和残奥会设施交付。该网站为奥运会将成为欧洲最大的重建项目( LSC , 2007 ) 。该中心的项目的本质是游戏发展设施以及再生东部省会城市,伦敦(英国广播公司, 2008年a)节。根据永隆银行(2006) ,奥运设施的发展和他们的遗留转换包括: (1)五个永久性场馆建设Velopark ,即奥林匹克体育场,水上运动中心,手球竞技场和伊顿竞技场(2)三个临时体育场馆(篮球体育馆,曲棍球和击剑场地) (3)国际广播中心/主新闻中心的建设; (4)永久及临时构筑物,道路和桥梁; (5)站点范围内的公用基础设施,土方工程和广泛的环境美化; ( 6 )广泛的游戏遗产后再生工程。
奥林匹克体育场简要起草产生惊人的80,000座位的体育场举办的田径赛事,以及奥运会和残奥会( 2006年永隆银行)的开幕式和闭幕式。游戏结束后,它会被拆卸下来,或者减少到25,000个座位,但仍然保留了维护和理性能力举办田径其核心使用(WLB ,2006年) ,体育,教育,文化和社区活动的范围。转换的球场80,000个座位的场地从55,000到25,000个座位的场地上拆下来的诀窍立即奥运会结束被视为极具创新性和拥护伟大的前瞻性思维( BBC , 2008A ) 。
拢496万奥运场馆设计的动机由伦敦申办遗赠世界一流的体育传统,而不是体现在往届奥运会继承了华丽的大厦(卫报“, 2008年)期间作出的承诺。在考虑如何降低,并拿出一个合理的成本,使拆卸的体育场(项目简要概述图5.2A所示)不太复杂,通常在体育场内,如餐饮服务,大多数酒吧,厕所和商品摊位将设在球场外的前院(卫报“, 2008年)的”豆荚“ 。
据英国广播公司( 2008A )的设计的主要特点是: (1)建到地面场上的发挥和更低的永久性座位,旨在使观众接近的行动;一个下沉式碗( 2 )25,000常任理事国席位+ 55,000可拆卸; (3)电缆支持屋顶,将伸展28米,体育场周围全路,为三分之二的观众提供掩护; (3)窗帘布将环绕体育场结构,作为额外的保护和庇护为观众(4)设施,如餐饮,商品将被分成自足'豆荚'结构。
用她的话说特莎乔韦尔MP奥林匹克大臣,颂扬美德的概念,并指出:“一旦奥运会结束,然后将被翻译成一个体育场,不仅将举办大奖赛的田径赛事和其他国家的体育赛事,但也会选区“ ( BBC ,2008年a )的社区服务。建成后的体育场将补充和补充等其他盛大的体育场馆在伦敦附近的温布利,酋长国和,特威克纳姆体育场(英国广播公司, 2008年a) 。
客户端
奥林匹克计划涉及一系列复杂的5个关键利益相关者( MPA ,2006) ,如图。 5.2c和申办奥运的构象与国际奥林匹克委员会( IOC )的指导方针(监护人, 2008B ) 。奥运板包括国务卿文化,媒体和体育,伦敦市长,莫伊尼汉勋爵,勋爵和杰克·莱姆利( MPA ,2006) 。提到的前两个人的椅子,而其余的董事会董事会或者充当顾问的身份( MPA ,2006) 。
奥运理事会的督导组( OBSG )包括:(1)高级官员5个关键的利益相关者,即官方发展援助(2)伦敦奥组委的奥运会(伦敦奥组委) ; (3)大伦敦市政府( GLA ) ; (4)英国奥林匹克协会( BOA )和(5)政府( MPA ,2006)。其主要职能是集体的意见和提供保证板( MPA ,2006年) 。这些利益相关者有不同的看法,什么构成成功。虽然他们都有不同的职责迈向成功的游戏,他们的个人目标已得到满足。值得一提的是,每场比赛他们不同的目标,以及不甘心。之间建立共同理解与和解的目标很简单,因为英国政府和国际奥委会的游戏最主要的首要目的之一是可持续发展。正如前面讨论的第4章中,伊根的报告建议可持续发展,这是与场馆建设的目标相一致。
国际奥委会的参数规定,建造成本价格招标在今年(2004年) ,而不是可能主办2012年的整体成本(监护人, 2008B ) 。这导致拢280万元的投标书的价格向国际奥委会(监护人, 2008B ) 。它预示着价格将不断上涨,由于通货膨胀在英国建筑业跑了6.5% ,截至2007年年底(监护人, 2008B ) 。预算不足的问题,产生了广泛的批评,部分是由于国际奥委会的严格指引呈现成本在一定的参数。在建筑行业的通胀是当前正在运行的近7 % ,在2004年对一个较低时作出的估计。国际奥委会应该考虑经济方面,允许在大多数会计未来的预测未来的价格作出。要注意,国际奥委会不得不等待这么长的时间变消极介绍使用招标年度成本体育场建8年时间作为实际成本!这是相当令人惊讶,有点令人沮丧。随着现行利率往往迫使成本上升,成本上升到100 %的增长,给公众的负面意见和看法!
球场的拆卸成本以及附加价值税(增值税) ,不包含在初始拢提交给国际奥委会,这意味着场内的280万美元的成本总是要花费超过原先想通(监护人, 2008B ) 。简短又匆匆从来没有的战术问题的整体概念相吻合。笔者估计,当时有没有全面的!异口同声的战略问题和战术问题不是因为流行的气氛不明朗中标。无论所选择的采购路线,简单的变化,必然会造成成本的变化。此外,拆卸和乐观的一个可能的买家的可拆卸部件,同时提供合理的理由,仍然可见,找到一个可能的买家可能是繁重的,或者是不可能的。设计和技术变化迅速,同样的创新,这往往导致材料的变化。今天的创新,可以是明天的错误!
愿景和战略目标以及拼写出来。根据MPA (2006年)的目标是“要举办一个鼓舞人心的,安全性和包容性的奥运会和残奥会离开伦敦和英国可持续的遗产” 。
正如图中所示。 5.2c以上,官方发展援助是公共机构,负责为奥运会所有新建场馆和基础设施的发展和建设,并代表客户项目( MPA ,2006) 。对华政府开发援助(ODA)被认为是一个相对较小的组织结构和行业代表呼吁民营快递合作伙伴选择占用资源提供和管理( MPA ,2006年)的混杂的平衡。 CLM但作为民营快递的合作伙伴选择。虽然他们是知识和经验的客户,如在第2章讨论,他们还聘请外部的专业知识,以加强他们的内部组合。在正确的方向考虑这一项目规模之手,这是一种聪明的做法。
CLM的是莱恩Ø洛克PLC ,锤有限公司和CH2M Hill公司组成的财团,并获委任的官方发展援助项目管理游戏的场馆和基础设施计划的工作。其功能包括整合设计,施工,调试,采购,调度和成本管理( MPA ,2006) 。财团签署了基于性能的合同,将赚取利润,如果达到目标,从而使它的奖励结构与交付。
5.2.3采购过程分析
官方发展援助的推出同时,突出高品质和物有所值的采购政策,采购合约听所有听2012年奥运会场馆和基础设施的发展(永隆银行,2006年b )作为核心价值观。官方发展援助的选择有竞争力的过程,促使了一体化设计,建设奥运场馆的设计和建设团队,以确保高品质的设计,施工及完成,调试,测试和许可的场馆为奥运会( 2006年创意比赛, )。
采购政策,如安全性措施,可持续性和传统的主题,从而使所有企业合同招标被评为根据平衡计分卡(永隆银行,2006年b ) 。政策预期导致一个良好的工作关系最好的英国建筑业(永隆银行,2006年b )中发现的企业和公司的可持续发展和持久的遗产,共同的价值观和目标。据设想,中标者必须有一个创新的设计天赋,能力,经验,技术专长,财政和经济实力(创意比赛,2006年) 。这是成功地实现通过任命的首选投标人。
官方发展援助的首选投标选项的电子招标(电子招标) ,分两个阶段竞争的过程,这使得企业参与招标(WLB ,2006年)在一个安全和有效的方式。在与欧盟指引(WLB ,2006年) , 7个国家和国际应用/出价灵犀收到资格预审的合同( NAO ,2008) 。因此,在遵守与公共合同法规,官方发展援助将资格预审标准,只会见了由罗伯特·麦卡尔平爵士有限公司提交(永隆银行,2006年) ,都被认为是可行的,符合要求( NAO ,2008) 。然而,这是值得注意的,竞争是激烈的,因为只有一个中标的进展到下一阶段。采用两阶段招标是给竞争从未实现的机会。作者惊愕,它是一种耻辱的行业。澳大利亚的公司,将有多重麦卡尔平爵士提供了激烈的竞争,他们已成功执行了温布利国家体育场项目。
此外,官方发展援助和罗伯特·麦卡尔平爵士有限公司和谅解备忘录(MoU ),这是具有法律约束力的签署同时设计和建造的奥林匹克体育场(永隆银行,2006年)之间的谈判开始。不舍的官方发展援助,一个特定的投标人队尽管没有建筑承包商的集成设计的核心要求建立中标( NAO , 2008 ) 。再次,这是一个耻辱,英国建筑业产生的国家国内生产总值的6% 。行动并不体现专业精神。集成的设计和施工方法,将减少风险和潜在的成本超支(创意比赛,2006年) 。然而,因为它变成了一个额外的拢29000000磅转化为拢5.25亿有望成为潜在的最终成本!官方发展援助估计,无精打采的利益为高调体育场项目在英国公共部门的风险感知的结果,也提前知识,体育场队也是一个投标人( NAO ,2008) 。然而,由于其他投标人的失败,官方发展援助进入到一个单一招标形式与队体育场( NAO ,2008) 。多重产生一个成功的温布利体育场的失败导致其非考虑。
谅解备忘录需要创建全集成设计的基础和建造合同,并记录承建商同意的条款而签订完整的合同之前,为进一步设计开发(永隆银行,2006年)的主要商业条款。相当多的设计和价值工程进行该项目,并允许签署的谅解备忘录的开发设计需要早期需要建立体育场( 2007年London2012 )钢材等大宗商品的采购。这是值得给予的荣誉,在这里观察,在第3和第4章,一个断言建议政府和行业报告是早期的供应链组合。此外,使用在第4章,这是2001年报告NAO现代化建设的一个重要主题,讨论在去除不必要的设计和成本价值管理是一个值得欢迎的坚持。
爵士麦卡尔有限公司和他们的设计师被称为队体育场(永隆银行,2006年) 。根据永隆银行( 2006A )队体育场包括:(1)罗伯特·麦卡尔平爵士有限公司(建造承包商) (2) , HOK体育有限公司(建筑师和体育场馆设计师)和(3) BÜRO Happold公司有限公司(结构和服务工程师(WLB ) ,2006年) 。这三家公司在不同的时间一起在不同的项目,即:(1)阿森纳体育场(罗伯特·麦卡尔平爵士有限公司, BÜRO Happold公司有限公司和HOK体育有限公司; ( 2 ) ExCeL展览中心(罗伯特·麦卡尔平爵士有限公司和Buro Happold公司有限公司) ;及(3)伊甸园项目(罗伯特·麦卡尔平爵士有限公司和Buro Happold公司有限公司) ,这表明整合供应链,长期的合作关系和协同工作的要求,在所有前面的章节。
因此,设计及建造合约队体育场签署, 2008年3月17日( NAO , 2008年) 。这说明单点责任,并遵守政府指示,有效的采购路线,充分体现了物有所值,在第2和第3章观察。潜在成本的预测5.25亿英镑,预计在二零零八年三月反映缺乏竞争力的采购过程中的设计和范围要求的变化作为屋顶修正的结果(审计署2008年) 。因此,拢525万代表作为潜在的最终成本4.96亿英镑的预算( NAO ,2008) 。这是共同所有的设计,并在第二章讨论建立路由及其变种。设计改变和变化是昂贵的。
5.2.4教训
它仍然是过早归于失败的奥林匹克体育场,因为玷污和不愉快的信息提供给公众。成本也不断升级的一天每一秒,这已经削弱了公众的头脑,体育场的成功投不好的印象。最凌乱的项目总是有时间和成本超支重视他们总是导致对对抗。当一个项目涉及多个利益相关者,很少有时间申办奥运,势必要匆忙组装的出价,这可能不是绝对无可挑剔。这表明教训应始终据悉从先前持有奥运会的限制。国际奥委会提交投标成本,在今年的托管,而不是在今年的招标,这是一个值得欢迎的行动已经采取了精彩的及时回归。
智能方法被抹去不好的印象,并重新建立公众的信心。表的时间已重置项目时间表,希望让体育场预定的时间之前提前三个月开始。此外,早期的组装的球队真的是帮助该项目的进展。
采购政策,这是在与利益相关者的目标的可持续性和传统推导灵犀被看作是在正确的方向是正确的一步。这已导致组成的团队在良好的工作安排。此外,它是值得承认的任何努力,是值得做的事情都应该做好。 ,爵士McAlpines '过去的成就纪录是他们成功的首要考虑因素,而温布利多重耻辱交付阻碍他们甚至参与项目投标。
可以看出,设计和建造体育场交付是正确的路线。虽然它不被限制,所以质量好,可以提高项目经理的密切监测,它的时间和成本肯定体育场交付是一个连接到它的长处,这是最重要的体育场交付。
案例2 :在温布利国家体育场
项目
有全世界相信,温布利国家体育场一直作为一个事件和娱乐中心(枪靶,2004年) ,有一个特殊的地方在英国的史册。在20世纪后期,温布利国家体育场举办系列大型公园,剧院和游艺活动,如1924年的大英帝国展, 1934年帝国运动会, 1948年的夏季奥运会, 1996年世界杯总决赛, 1978年欧洲电视网歌曲大赛1996年的欧洲锦标赛和其他几个事件之间上演(枪靶2004年) 。
该体育场于2002年被拆除和重建于2006年的90,000个座位的体育场( WNSL ,2008) 。新拢757万温布利国家体育场( NAO ,2003年) ,现在几乎三次一样大,其前大小与它的主要定位140米以外的大堂,这被认为是巨大的,足以下方滚动伦敦眼! (枪靶, 2004年) 。虽然拱体育场的符号取代了双塔,温布利国家体育场仍然被认为是一个图标,就像老温布利球场( SPG , 2008A ) 。虽然争论落后的标志性双塔拆迁,但它是值得给予荣誉,为最终解决拱无可挑剔的选择轩然大波。
触发该项目是在1996年,一个新的英语国家体育场的喧嚣,因此国家竞争后,英格兰体育overwhelmly选择了温布利的首选网站(下议院,2004年) 。英格兰体育的总体目标是支持发展的三大运动包括足球,橄榄球联赛和田径( NAO ,2003年)的标志性体育场。
温布利国家体育场的主要用途是足球和橄榄球联赛( NAO ,2003年) 。它的任务,五年后体育场的操作,其年度营业额的1%捐赠由WNSL为体育教育和其他项目( NAO ,2003年)的交付。
客户端
英格兰足球协会( FA )是体育场项目走在了前列,并通过其附属公司,球场最终被带到生活WNSL (下议院,2004年) 。 WNSL负责建设,经营和拥有新球场( NAO ,2003年) ,因此被控。温布利国家体育场项目是完全由私营部门组织开展,大部分资金由私人资本( NAO ,2003年) 。
体育场建设公共部门的贡献是拢161万的细分: (1) 1.2亿英镑从英格兰体育; (2)拢20万部文化,媒体和体育部(DCMS ) ; ( 3 ) 2100万英镑从伦敦发展署( NAO ,2003年) 。如图的关键利益相关者(无论是公共部门和私营部门)和各类用途的资金全部贡献。 5.3B分别5.3c 。
从温布利国家体育场的运作所产生的利润用于由足球( NAO的利益,2003年)的FA 。轨道的问题纳入设计创建了一个位英格兰体育(SE)和WNSL下议院( 2004年)之间的恶语相向。然而,后来决定,田径代价(轨道)应撤销SE被说服不情愿地接受( NAO ,2003年) 。这种行为被看作是不公平的。作为关键利益攸关者应该被称为和SE在作出任何决定之前,征求意见,会议之一。也许价值管理工作应该已经在一个行业报告和所有利益相关者进行讨论,特别是东南将有一个共同的理解,为什么要删除的曲目是。
采购过程的分析
1999年7月14日, WNSL扔公开招标承办商提交的温布利国家体育场(大厦,2008) 。 Mowlem ,HBG ,爵士麦卡尔和牛黄多元/公司回应邀请(大厦,2008) 。 2002年初, Cyril SWEETT的被由WNSL聘请为独立顾问,因此公司给多重合同干净的表提供物有所值( SPG , 2008A ) 。最初,多重作为首选承包商同意在保证最高价格(GMP)的设计和建造合约拢326.5米(不包括设计费)一个31/4-year程序构建的温布利体育场( 2008年大厦)。温布利国家体育场项目于2007年完成球场最终囫囵吞枣4.45亿英镑( NAO ,2003年)在以惊人的成本为7.57亿英镑(下议院,2004年) 。该项目侵占了时间和成本。
建筑师福斯特和合作伙伴和HOK体育设计的球场进行,而诺曼·福斯特爵士设计的拱和车顶结构( SPG , 2008A ) 。据大厦(2008年)开始招标过程中与牛黄/多重财团于2000年任命的首选承包商,后来被溶解,复被任命。牛黄选择了退出,设想时商定的价格是不能成立或可见(大厦,2008) 。这是球场的问题成因。作为一种根深蒂固的公司在英国,牛黄很清楚地明白,在那个成本,建设是不可见的。然而,由于似是而非的智能播放的WNSL和恶作剧ubiquities的与设计相关的构建路线承包商投标等待索赔和变化,提高自己的利润,以低。 WNSL下跌的陷阱,并签署了一项协议。但是,这竟然是导致众多的指控和法院的案件对抗性。此外, Tropus首次获委任为温布利的合同项目经理跑了出来,因此西蒙兹(大厦, 2008年)所取代。
由于在1996年为国家体育场叫嚣,温布利,因此选择作为网站的首选(下议院,2004年) 。两年后,东南获得1.2亿英镑用于发展项目(下议院,2004年) 。然而,设想的建设成本将在1998年为3.2亿英镑,并在该地区内可完成4年( 2004年下议院) 。
然而,该项目在2000年遭受金融挫折和额外的公共资金的请求英足总在2001年发起的,但国务卿文化,媒体和体育部( DCMS )下跌问帕特里克·卡特检讨项目(下议院,2004年) 。被浪费掉了一个惊人的一笔160万英镑审查项目(下议院,2004) 。从笔者的角度来看,花费金额在审查不体现物有所值。一份报告从Tropus应该已采取严重,并下令重新招标,而不是花钱很少有效报告审查和未来。
审查过程中,有人指出,有失误的项目由WNSL和DCMS任命多重功能,如采购过程的管理,导致作为主承包商的担忧也认识到建立体育场(下议院,2004年) 。
这种担忧导致到其源于当时的主席温布利国家体育场有限公司(下议院,2004年)的要求,由大卫·詹姆斯先生CBE调查。虽然没有斑点的不当行为的证据被发现,严重关切提出了以平等的机会是否被授予所有投标下议院( 2004) 。然而,达成一个结论的采购过程中没有达到最高标准,行业有望在下议院( 2004) 。会议指出,全面正式的采购过程中没有制定由WNSL和奖相同的合同,他们跑了两个独立的相应的招标程序不同的条款(下议院,2004年) ,这也被看做。为了支撑非执法水平打地基,也有人指出,他们有多重对话开始正式的采购过程(下议院,2004年)之前。作为建筑行业的客户端,行动被看作是对最佳实践。作为一个行业,玷污的形象问题,一个良好和公平的水平打地基,预计将建设客户端提供的所有杂积极参与。
因此可以得出结论文化,媒体和体育进一步的公共资金的可用性将取决于满足一系列的测试,由双方的FA和WNSL的下议院( 2004)由当时的国务卿。然而,这些测试后满足该项目被认为是值得称道的进一步支持(下议院,2004年) 。
DCMS认为重新招标施工合同条件进一步支持被丢弃在地面上,没有储蓄的可能性将达到公帑(下议院,2004年) 。这是一个明智的决定,考虑到160万英镑已经花费审查和重新招标,可能会浪费更多的时间。
两份报告发表由Tropus和詹姆斯,他们得出的结论是WNSL从未遵循最佳做法,从而失去了最佳值(大厦,2008) 。然而,有人认为,在英国工业的球员没有得到足够的机会去争夺(建筑,2008) 。
拱施工开始于2003年,其制造现场使用由分包商克利夫兰桥钢制造的钢模块。然而,不可调和的分歧之间爆发克利夫兰大桥和复用和前不得不离开项目和分包叫做霍兰迪亚( SPG , 2008A )的另一家钢铁所取代。克利夫兰大桥是不确定的,如果他们将被聘用的材料( SPG , 2008A )支付。这后来导致成一个案件( SPG , 2008A ) 。这增强长的时间关系和有效的供应链整合早在前面的章节中讨论的问题。笔者估计,牛黄/多重财团将提供成功所需的强大的供应链关系。牛黄是一种根深蒂固的公司,了解英国的产业,并拥有强大的供应链,扶着不像澳大利亚公司。在接受欧盟指令,它也是更重要的是看幅度由公司执行的项目,正在审议的国家先行。如果有强大的供应链关系,多重钢分包商之间的付款方式的不信任,这个问题就不会出现了。
经验教训
预计将产生成本和时间肯定是从来没有在温布利球场的设计和构建及其各种变种。预计更替的设计及建造,采用案例研究,让客户有机会更替设计师之前,承建商后输出规格已完全指定的设计有很大的投入。从案例研究,又匆匆的GMP更替的设计及建造合约由WNSL组装没有完全建立的要求。这被认为是不恰当的,在前面的章节中讨论,可能会导致对对抗。因此,该项目具有众多的诉讼案件。
也有人指出,该项目是充满了敌对关系,对双方的客户和承包商,承包商和分包商。在第四章中讨论的所有的基准报告主张长期合作关系和有效的供应链管理。英国建筑业地形的知识是非常必要的,正如在案例研究不太充分了解多重。 WNSL也从来没有提出物质容易通过允许牛黄走出去的过程和协议,只有澳洲的公司蜂拥进入。在案例研究中指出,多重或者部分丧失了英国建筑业的作案手法,笔者估计这就是为什么多重订立的财团牛黄。然而, WNSL行动,并考虑复用可以被看作仅仅根据价格可能非常低的成本考虑,这是不是与最佳实践相一致。强有效的供应链是没有项目领导供应链之间的由于缺乏长期关系,巨大的裂谷。
正如案例研究中的奥运场馆之一,其执行失败的温布利国家体育场多重形象已经玷污。由此可以得出结论,一家建筑公司在动荡的英国建筑业继续存在和进步,过去成功和不成功的项目执行,必将发挥重大的作用在其成功的招标投标。
最后,该项目被认为缺乏有效的利益相关者管理。由于需要考虑改变任何方面的项目前,必须考虑到所有利益相关者。有效和及时的考虑需要的口号。
案例3 :阿森纳酋长球场
项目
酋长球场是一个60000座位的体育场,在Ashburton Grove的建造海布里球场前的地面( SPG , 2008B )的替代品。酋长球场是家名为阿森纳的英超联赛足球俱乐部。
公告新球场将在2004年年底,被称为酋长球场赞助合同后拢100万元,与阿联酋航空( SPG , 2008B )击中。该体育场将被称为酋长球场至少体育场的业务的前15年( SPG , 2008B ) 。从2006/07年足球赛季的开始,也同意支付一个8年球衣赞助上被列入拢100亿美元的交易( SPG , 2008B ) 。
阿什伯顿格罗夫是非常接近海布里( SPG , 2008B ) 。包括温布利球场阿什伯顿格罗夫长期以来已经称为为向上90年( SPG , 2008B ;阿森纳,2008)定居前,看着几个选项。这是符合客户的目标与该地区保持密切的联系( SPG , 2008B ) 。
此外,可持续发展是一个特殊的考虑在其设计和在其房屋发展,的BREEAM生态公寓标准是其首要准绳( SPG , 2008B ) 。这被看作是符合产业基准报告建议可持续性。该项目还包括住房开发和废物回收中心( SPG , 2008B ) 。
客户端
一拢390万现代化的体育场,一个新的废物回收中心和无可挑剔的业务搬迁的建设是其首要目标是阿森纳足球俱乐部(阿森纳,2008) 。
对于项目的成功交付,阿森纳控股有限公司的附属公司称为阿什伯顿地产形成拢260亿美元优先贷款融资作抵押,从银行集团金融体育场设施( SPG , 2008B ) 。
该银行集团是由:(1)苏格兰皇家银行PLC (2)圣埃斯皮里图投资(3)爱尔兰银行,爱尔兰联合银行(4) ,(5) CIT集团结构性融资(英国)有限公司及(6) HSH北方银行( SPG , 2008B ) 。执行该项目的剩余资金来自阿森纳足球俱乐部从格拉纳达,耐克通过资金,并在体育场现场为新的住房发展( SPG , 2008B ) ,出售剩余土地资产的变现现金。特拉华北部餐饮公司出资1500万英镑的独家权利,以负责球场的餐饮业务( SPG , 2008B )体育场的餐饮设施通过。虽然有位扯起规划和资金安排,资金仍然充足抵押提前时间定义并建立良好的客户目标。这弥补了充分体现了一个完美的私人经营的项目有一个定义良好的目标,应在随后的章节。
采购过程的分析
2001年,首次亮相球场的计划设计和爵士McAlpines '出价成功,作为主承包商为体育场次年( 2006年利德尔)接受。采用两阶段招标的招标过程,并初步包干固定百分比承包商的预赛,而后者的利润和管理费用(利德尔,2006年) 。然而,当达成了一项协议,工程包津贴,转换因而作出一个符合GMP( 2006)利德尔。这是一个聪明的决定部分承建商有确定性成本卷入与GMP之前,因为涉及很多工作包合同的体育场,以及废物回收中心(利德尔,2006年) 。因此,所有工作包承包商也参与设计,以提高可建造(利德尔,2006年) 。体育场预算两个星期内交付截止日期前(利德尔,2006年) 。不像在温布利多重,爵士McAlpines '经验的英国建筑业是巨大的。承办商清楚知道什么需要提供一个成功的项目。承包商知道在哪里可以爆发敌对关系并采取聪明的办法,与他们打交道,才答应的GMP合同。有效地利用两阶段招标总是会导致我的客户价值, ,允许承包商全面份额的理解什么是客户价值。
的爵士罗伯特McAlpines '导演文斯Corrigan和项目经理安德鲁Veness的的的话说,该项目面临着一些挑战,如: ( 1 )职业由当地企业的网站(2)铁路线横盘的网站; (3 )交付必须是2006/07赛季开始前,及(4)整理的规划和资金的问题(特殊的表演,2007年)的作品9个月中断。然而,对所有这些可能性,该项目已成功交付承办。正如下面的案例研究,早期的承包商和供应链有效和选择性的参与是成功的关键。
此外,有几个原因援引的成功交付了球场,但最首要和最显着的原因是由主承包商(特殊演员,2007年)创建的有效的和有选择性的供应链。有人指出,分包商的早期参与,罗伯特·麦卡尔平爵士已经建立了长期的关系,是魔法(特殊演员, 2007年) 。这是信任,沟通和赋权(特殊演员,2007年)的一个缩影。该项目被看作是没有正式的争端,因为该项目从一开始(特殊演员,2007年)建立的信任的结果。合同有效的过程,编程和项目的成功交付(特殊演员,2007年)规划的系统和流程,及时的会议和良好的客户态度背后的神奇。该体育场交付一起与HOK体育和Happold公司BÜRO (阿森纳,2008) 。正如在前面的章节中讨论,信任起着巨大的作用,在成功交付的项目。在温布利国家体育场,复用和钢子承包商从来没有建立信任关系的个案研究。有没有两者之间的长期合作关系,以提供所需的信任。正如这导致了不同的法庭案件。本案例研究的最佳实践行动的缩影。建球场出来,一流的质量和缺乏时间和成本超支。有人指出,有效地提供项目肯定会增加排名,从而争取更多的项目机会。这是在官方发展援助的代价爵士McAlpines '最好的承办商运送奥运体育场的声明可见。虽然有反对呼声太高,在奥运场馆的成功交付,选择爵士McAlpines已经浇上逮捕。
5.4.4教训
本案例研究表明,“酒好不怕巷子深” 。这是播种,一定会收获什么。客户端设置其目标和输出规范涉及的主要承包商之前,聪明的做法。同样,主要承办了智能的方法,在处理与客户和分包商。
聘用承办商,了解英国建筑业地形扮演了很长的路要走,在成功交付的项目。拥有有效的供应链,并建立了长期的合作关系也发挥了显著作用,在成功交付的场馆。信托被看作是一种稀缺的商品在英国建筑业也是一个神奇的在酋长球场成功交付。因此,本案例研究表明,信任,不应该是一种稀缺商品,如果一个客户端可以指定其输出规格和目标之前,该项目从一开始就从事主承建商。同样,聘请承办商与英国的紧密联系,是非常必要的。从这个案例研究是合理的,有效的和有选择性的供应链所倡导的政府和行业的标杆报告可以看出。
结论
最好的和不好的做法已展出的案例研究分析。个案研究是认真选择建设项目成果可以由建设客户的影响,不论所选择的采购路线突出程度。强调案例研究,案例研究有不同的利益相关者弥补。奥林匹克体育场相关人士被看作是公共部门建设的客户,甚至超越了超越身体特定国家站在整个世界。温布利体育场的利益相关者,另一方面,被认为是一个混杂的私人和公共部门客户。然而,酋长球场的利益相关者主要是私营部门的客户。
虽然所有的典型案例有不同的变种采用相同的采购路线,让更多的客户参与和设计的投入,他们还是来到了不同的结果。案例研究表明在一定程度上,它是没有选择的航线是不利的项目,但领导和各方参与,在很大程度上决定了项目的成功交付。虽然奥林匹克体育场是仍在进行中,可以看出,所涉及的客户行业的号召,尽管摇摇欲坠的项目开始真正回应。在奥运场馆项目的钱采购路线,使用的项目经理来支撑的知识基础和早期参与的集成化供应链的可持续发展,价值明显。然而,在温布利体育场看到的缩影不好的做法。该项目是充满着对对抗成本低,接受招标,偏袒招标和非有效的供应链整合。另一方面,酋长球场是一个无可挑剔的最佳实践的例子。可持续发展,协同工作,有效的和有选择性的一体化供应链管理和早期承包商参与项目的成分。该项目得到了有效的执行,缺乏对对抗,并在预算之内,甚至在约定的时间出来。
因此,可以得出结论,在更大程度上在建设客户手中的建设项目的成功在于。对于有效采用的采购路线,提供集成化的工作和成功的结果,施工承包商选择呈现什么是好的做法和承包商的自由客户的态度是至关重要的。设计和构建采购的路线是一个无可挑剔的,美妙的选择,为您提供物有所值所信奉的基准测试报告,但在很大程度上取决于它是如何实现的。建设客户仍然需要接受呼叫领导和积极变化,英国建筑业的指挥棒。长期协同工作,整合供应链和供应链的有效沟通下来是重要的成功秘诀。
5.6参考文献
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