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代写英国assignment,Ministerial Responsibility Hong Kong
发表日期:2013-09-30 08:52:24 | 来源:assignment.cc | 当前的位置:首页 > 代写assignment > 英国代写assignment > 正文
Ministerial Responsibility Hong Kong
Introduction
Ministerial Responsibility (MR) is commonly founded in Westminster’s country, particularly in the United Kingdom. Gillian Peele concluded that the ministerial responsibility is a convention in the British Parliament. Minister should be responsible to the legislature for their conduct or department outcome (Peele, 2004: 46). It aimed at enhancing the accountability and protecting the public interest.
Hong Kong, as a world-class city under Chinese sovereignty, has been also setting up a ministerial responsibility from mid-summer of 2002. The former Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chee-hwa, attended the Legislative council in April of 2002. He announced the ultimate objective of Principal Official Accountability System is introducing the idea of ‘responsibility’ to those principal officials, especially, Chief Secretary for Administrator, Financial Secretary, Secretary for Justice and all directors of Bureaux (Tung 2002). However, many incidents proved that Westminster’s minister responsibility system has not been fully applied in Hong Kong during these five years, such as, the Car Scandal of Antony Leung and the resignation of Regina Ip.
In this paper, it will use Britain as an example to illustrate POAS of HK is similar to the traditional concept of ministerial responsibility. It will also argue that the concept of Westminster’s style could only marginally apply in Hong Kong mainly due to its political constraints. This paper will be divided into four parts. First, it will illustrate the concept of Westminster’s “ministerial responsibility”. Second, it will find out those similarities between POAS and British setting. Third, it will point out how the political institution limits its practice. Finally, it will use the Car gate scandal to illustrate the political institution constraint the practice of POAS.
The job role and responsibility of Westminster’s minister
Westminster’s ministerial responsibility is a convention which cannot be well-defined. To understand this concept, it is better to have a look on the basic job task of “minister” and the concept of “responsibility” separately.
R. Pyper observed that the job task of a minister includes four aspects. They should lead the department, manage department, pilot legislation in the Parliament and represent the departmental interest (Pyper 1996: 4). The minister is also playing as the gatekeeper of the policy. He should also responsible for his policy outcome. When the policy outcome could create unintended consequences, he should take the remedial measures to solve the problem. Those aspects can illustrate the role and responsibility of the minister specifically.
Brich advocated that a political actor should be responsive to the public opinion. He should be also accountable for his action to anybody, especially the Parliament (Brich 1989: 25). His ideas show the concept of ‘answerability’ and ‘accountability’. By attending the particular policy committee of the parliament and answering the enquiries from the opposition party, the public interest could be well-protected. On the other hand, the transparency could also be achieved.
Simply speaking, the ministerial responsibility not only means accounting for certain things, departmental action, the policy outcome and his personal conduct, but he should also provide answerability to the executive and legislative branch. He should resign if the minister could not meet those standards or fail to gain the support from the Parliament.
The features of Westminster’s ministerial responsibility Ministerial responsibility includes collective and individual responsibility. According to Marshall, confidence, unanimity and confidentiality are three key elements of collective responsibility (Marshall, 1989: 3). For the collective responsibility, minister should protect the policy which is the final decision of the cabinet. S/He necessarily contains the spread of confidential document which served as national interest. On the other hand, providing accurate information, explaining his behavior and answering Parliament’s enquiry is the individual ministerial responsibility.
The ministerial responsibility could commonly be founded in Westminster system. Barendt stated that the ministerial responsibility is a key feature of a Parliamentary constitution which is a fusion of power between executive and legislature (Barendt, 1998: 120). Fusion of power means the government post maybe filled by the legislature. Since the majority party in the Parliament form the government, it is always difficult for the opposition to give harsh criticism towards the executive branch.
Woodhouse found out that ministerial responsibility has five levels of accountability. They are redirectory, informatory, explanatory, amendatory and sacrificial (Woodhouse 1994:28). Based on these levels, minister should provide accurate information for his action and amend the shortcoming of his department. And, the highest level is resignation which is resulted from private or political misjudgment. Normally Speaking, the minister should offer the resignation under two conditions. When the House of Commons passes the non-confidence vote, it means the minister should resign. The minister should also provide a resignation if his important bill was failed to pass in the House of Commons.
The Practice of Principal Official Accountability System (POAS)
Before talking about the introduction of the POAS, the background and reasons should be examined. Jermain Lam summarized that there were three major reasons which led to the POAS, such as, reduce the policy failure, enhance the government performance and increase the accountability (Lam 2004: 197). First, there was an increasing public demand for accountability due to a series of policy failures and scandals, such as, the 85,000 housing policy and the Short Pile Scandal. Second, the government wanted to enhance her performance by asking the external expert to join the government, such as, Antony Leung and Frederick Ma. Third, the government imposed the ministerial system to enhance the accountability.
Based on above reasons, the POAS was established when Tung started his second term of Chief Executive. The ultimate aim of this ministerial system is to enhance the accountability of the principal government official. In addition, the civil servant had to do the political work before 2002. Introducing the POAS could maintain the professional and neutrality image of the civil servant. Besides, the POAS tries to find out suitable person to serve the community and enhance the policy implementation. Moreover, the POAS not only aims at improving the relationship between the Legislative Council (LegCo) and the Executive, but also brings a responsive government to the public (Constitutional Affairs Bureau, 2006: 2).
The operation of the POAS is sophisticated and specified. Under this system, the principal official will be chosen from inside and outside of the government system. There are totally fourteen principal officials who are participating in this system, especially, the three secretaries of Department and eleven Directors of Bureau. Their job roles are mainly focusing on the political works, such as, providing policy leadership, answering LegCo questions and collecting public opinion. Besides, there will be Permanent Secretaries, a civil servant with D8 rank, to assist the appointed official under each department. For the civil servant, they will remain political neutrality.
Setting up the POAS could also bring a great impact towards the political system. According to Lam and Cheung, the Chief Executive could reduce the political influence and important role of the senior government official under the POAS system (Lam: 2004; Cheung: 2003). It implied that the civil servant could not play as the major role in ruling HK. The leadership of CE could also be strengthened by bringing pro-government party into the Executive Council (Exco) and appointing the principal officials who share the similar political belief with the CE. The Exco is no longer act as an advisory committee, but perform the task of Cabinet in Westminster system, especially, the final decision of policy making. Generally speaking, the CE is the gainer of introducing the POAS.
The similarity and difference between Westminster’s ministerial responsibility and POAS
Since the POAS has been adopting for five years, government and academia thought that it was a ministerial responsibility. Donald Tsang indicated that POAS as ‘Hong Kong-style ministerial system’ (Tsang 2002). Respectively, C.Y. Cheung also wrote ‘POAS is essentially a form of individual responsibility’ (Cheung 2005: 163). However, those statements implied that the POAS is not fully copied from the Westminster. It just follows those features in the name only and ignores the essence of the Westminster’s ministerial responsibility.
Objectives
The ultimate aim of both systems is seeking for the accountability. In the Bristish system, the Parliament could account for the minister’s behavior and his policy failure. In Hong Kong, those appointed officials are accountable to LegCo theoretically. Due to the representative democracy, it could say that both systems could bring a responsive government to the public. Under the Minister Code or Basic Law Article 64, those appointees should not only attend the legislative meeting regularly, but also provides accurate information to the public. However, attending the LegCo meeting is the choice of those appointed official. The appointed officials are also mainly responsible to the CE for the policy success and failure. However, the CE is not elected by the universal suffrage. It is doubt that the accountability could really be achieved.
Appointment System
The appointment process is similar. In Britain, those ministers are recommended by the Prime Minister. They should gain the approval from the monarchy. In Hong Kong, those officials are selected by the Chief Executive. The Central government could decide the appointment. However, the different method of gaining power could affect its legitimacy. Those ministers under Parliament system should win the election first. The POAS officials do not face the election. They are only political appointed by the CE with a contract basis. This shows the representative of the principal official in HKSAR is lower than the minister under parliamentary system. Since those appointees have a low legitimacy, tension always exists between the executive branch and LegCo in Hong Kong. Moreover, there is also a contradiction in the POAS. The Secretary of Civil Service is an appointee who is also a senior civil servant. It seems that this inherent flaw violates the original objective which is looking for political neutrality of civil servant.
The role of Legislature
The Parliament or LegCo is a major mechanism to check and monitor the performance of appointed officials. However, their approach is very extreme. For the Parliament, the non-confidence vote is a direct method which can show their dissatisfactions. On the other hand, there is also a ‘shadow cabinet’ to monitor the government rule by using committee investigation. However, LegCo does not have this coercive power. Motion debate and private member’s bill is the only way for expressing their dissatisfaction. Those methods can exert pressure on the CE to ask the appointed official to resign for gaining the public support and popularity. However, the private member and the motion debate could be easily turned down by the fragmented LegCo setting. As a result, the LegCo could not play as efficient role as the Westminster’s Parliament.
Regulation
The minister has his own regulation to obey. In the Britain, the Ministerial Code is the guidance which regulates minister action. In Hong Kong, this is replaced by the Code for Principal Officials under the Accountability System. Both systems require their official to declare their interest, such as, financial and personal interest. It sounds that HK did a great job to prevent the conflict of interest for those appointed officials. However, Chueng commented that the code of POAS is not sufficient to build a foundation for developing the individual ministerial responsibility (Cheung 2003: 260). It does not clearly define those three levels responsibility, such as, policy outcome, personal misconduct and departmental fault. Based on this, the code does not only imply the regulation is not specific enough for the official to follow, but also can not be implemented significantly.
Resignation
The difference between of Westminster and Hong Kong is very extreme. By the convention of Britain, the minister should provide resign under two conditions. First, the minister should resign after the non-confidence vote was passed in the House of Commons. Secondly, the minister should offer a resignation when his major bill is failed to pass by the majority of the House of Commons. In Hong Kong, these scenarios may not lead to the resignation of the appointed official. For example, Antony Leung was involved in the Car Scandal. Although he offered the resignation to the CE, CE could have the final decision to reject it. It showed that there is not any mechanism which leads the principal official to step down. And, it failed to achieve the purpose of POAS.
To have a short conclusion, it reveals that the POAS could just learn the ‘key’ features from the Westminster’s style. Although their ultimate aims are the same, the essence of the traditional ministerial responsibility could not be fully applied in Hong Kong, especially, the regulation and resignation.
How does the HK political institution constraint the practice of the Westminister’s ministerial responsibility Generally speaking, the ultimate aim of POAS is seeking for the accountability of the HKSAR government. However, there are many incident reveal that the development of ministerial responsibility is under satisfactory, such as, the Car Scandal of Antony Cheung and SARS incident. According to John Uhr and Cheung, an effective accountability is building upon two foundations. There should be mechanisms for providing information and imposing sanctions (Uhr, 1998: 63; Cheung, 2003: 256). In spite of those elements, the undemocratic election of Chief Executive, the strong executive-led system and insufficient channel for the public to express their opinion could also constraint the development of the ministerial responsibility.
Low Transparency and asymmetric information flow
Transparency has a positive relation with the information flow. A government without transparency is difficult for the public to monitor its performance and governance. Rowena Kowk notes that “transparency is a precondition if the public are to effectively hold the government to account for ministerial responsibility to be meaningfully discharged” (Kwok 2003:116). In Hong Kong, there is already a Code of Access to Information. However, our code is still far from satisfactory. The accessibility of information heavily depended on the attitude of those government departments. Without a transparent government and well-established information flow, it is difficult for the ministerial responsibility to develop in Hong Kong. It is difficult to chase for the individual responsibility or any policy failure.
Fragmented Legislature without any coercive power
Legislative Council is enjoying a higher legitimacy than the Chief Executive since it is formed by fully election in Hong Kong. However, it may not have sufficient power to seek for accountability. It is mainly due to the Basic Law which limits the authority of LegCo. First, the non-confidence vote is not legal binding. Even the LegCo passes this bill, the minister still does not need to step down from his office. According to Lam, there were only two secretaries, the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works, would resign if they receive the vote of non-confidence from the LegCo (Lam 2004: 203). Second, the LegCo members need to have the consent of CE when they introduce a bill is related to the public expenditure or political structure. Third, the voting by group rule also provides a buffer zone for the government. Those embarrassing bill is always turned down by the functional constituency. For example, the non-confidence vote towards Antony Leung is finally turned down by the functional constituency and pro-government party. Based on those reasons, the LegCo can not seek for the appointee’s accountability.
Undemocratic Election of Chief Executive
The small circle of CE election also constraints the practice of POAS. He is only selected by the one thousand and six hundred election committee. Since the CE is not elected by the universal suffrage, he is not totally responsible to the public. Although Basic Law article 73 stated that LegCo can impeach the CE, the removal of CE is highly determined by the PRC government. As a result, people believe that the CE is just responsible to the PRC rather than the HK society. On the other hand, the CE has the highest authority to choose his executive team, especially the Principal Officials. However, those principal officials do not gain the power by the open election or even approved by the LegCo. Emily Lau, the LegCo member, also criticized that the POAS is different from the Western countries since the principal officials are lacked of representatives. The public could not remove the officials by their votes (Lau 2002). Since the election of CE and the appointment of those appointees are undemocratic, the public could not hold the accountability easily.
Strong Executive-led system
The Hong Kong Chief Executive enjoys the highest authority in the political context, especially, forming his political team. The nomination process and resignation are both highly controlled upon the preference of the Chief Executive. It does not need to gain any formal approval from the LegCo. Besides, the Chief executive can control the information flow toward the LegCo. The Basic Law and the legislature house rules offer that CE could use the public interest as a reason to refuse to offer any useful information to the LegCo. Based on this, the strong executive-led system provides a protective shelter to those appointees while it is difficult to seek for the accountability.
Insufficient channel to express public opinion
Enhancing the accountability need a comprehensive channel for the public to express their opinions. However, most channels are responsible to the CE, such as the Commissioner of the Independent Commission against Corruption, Director of Audit. Cheung pointed out that it is hard for the public to believe those watchdogs are free from executive interference while those appointees are also under the leadership of CE (Cheung, 2003: 266). Finding the LegCo member is the only way to express their dissatisfactions. But, the LegCo member also faces a lot of constraints. For example, they can only focus on some controversial issues and lack of sanction power. Based on this, it can conclude that there is not sufficient institution to express the public dissatisfaction.
Case Study: Antony Leung’s Car gate Scandal Since those above arguments just mention the practice of POAS theoretically, this section will illustrate by a real-life example: the Car gate Scandal. Leung’s scandal regarded as personal immorality. He violated the Code for Principle Officials under the Accountability System since he purchased a car prior to the raise of the first resignation tax for vehicles. It is a case having conflict of interest. Although he provided a series of remedial measures, the donation and apology, it still could not gain back the trust for the public. Based on this, he offered his resignation. However, his resignation was finally accepted after four months of this incident released. It did not only violate the core values of ministerial responsibility, but also showed the POAS was not working properly due to its political institution.
Leung’s incident already revealed that the information flow is highly determined by those officials themselves. According to Choy, Apple Daily requested Leung to explain the reasons of purchasing the car. However, Leung still did not have any response in front of media and the public. As a result, the media disclosed this scandal two days later (Choy 2005: 154). If the transparency cannot be enhanced, the accountability and responsibility of appointee will not be held easily.
LegCo could not play an effective role in seeking the responsibility of Antony Leung. As mentioned, the vote of non confidence was failed since the majority of the functional constituency did not support. In addition, the Panel of Constitutional Affairs did urge for the impeachment power. However, the Secretary of Constitutional Affairs Bureau, Stephen Lam, replied that the Basic Law does not delegate the impeachment power to LegCo. Based on this case, Antony Leung, the principal appointee, did not receive any punishment from the LegCo.
The incident reveals that the accountability and responsibility will not be achieved if the selection of CE and principal official is undemocratic. Generally speaking, Tung’s administration was not directly accountable to the public. Also, appointees are only determined by the CE without the approval of LegCo.So, Leung was only accountable to Tung. For example, he stated that he would only offered resignation if the CE requested him to do so. This statement could show Leung did not only lack of the concept of accountability, but also illustrated the undemocratic institution limited the practice of ministerial responsibility.
The Tung’s executive-led system played a role to distort the nature of POAS. Even the Financial Secretary tried to responsible for his fault directly by offering resignation, he still can in the office based on the support of Mr. Tung. When Anotny offered the resignation to Tung in March of 2003, he just refused Leung’s resignation and gave a formal criticism. This case strongly supports that the minister does not need face his responsibility if the CE is willing to protect his colleague.
The July First incident not only focused on the dissatisfaction on the Tung’s rule, but also revealed insufficient channel for the public to express their anger on the Leung’s scandal. According to the performance evaluation survey, carried out by the Chinese University in 2002, stated Leung’s popularity already dropped extremely after the scandal (Wong 2003: 5). It showed the massive discontent on Antony. Since the LegCo, their representatives, could not impose any measures to seek for the accountability, the public became angrier. Based on this, it was part of those reasons which led the people to step up in the July First Protest in 2003.
Conclusion
Tung did try to bring an accountable and responsive government by introducing the POAS. The objectives of POAS and Westminster’s ministerial responsibility are nearly the same. However, the Antony’ scandal already proved the practice of POAS is far from the success of Westminster one. Jermain Lam pointed out “the institutional weaknesses of the ministerial system in Hong Kong, it is not realistic to expect that a high degree accountability will be achieved.” (Lam 2004: 213) The ‘institutional setting’ includes asymmetric information flow, fragmented LegCo, undemocratic election of CE, a dominant executive system and insufficient channel to express public views in this paper.
In order to overcome those political constraints of the POAS, three main solutions should be adopted. First, a democratic and legitimated election of CE should be established. This will bring the CE and his executive team to face the public critism. Second, the role of the LegCo should be strengthened by giving them approval and impeachment power. Third, the government should establish a better information flow and allow the public to express their opinion on those ministers. If those measures can not be adopted, the core values, accountability, answerability and responsibility, are difficult to achieve under the POAS.
Reference
Baremdt, Eric 1998. ‘Government and Executive Power’, in Peter Birks(eds), An Introduction to Constitutional Law, London: Oxford University Press, pp.120-124
Brich, A.H. 1964. ‘Responsibility in British Politics’, in Geoffrey Marshall(eds), Ministerial Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-28.
Cheung Chor-yung. 2003. ‘The Quest for Good Governanace: Hong Kong’s Principal Officials Accountability System’. China: An International Journal, Vol 1, No 2, September 2003, pp. 249-272
Cheung Chor-yung. 2005. ‘The Principal Officials Accountability System: Not Taking Responsible Government Seriously?’ in Joseph Y S Cheng (eds), The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, pp. 151-183
Constructional Affairs Bureau. 2006. Consultation Document on Further Development of the Principal Official Accountability System, Hong Kong: HKSAR government, pp. 2-3
Jerman T.M. Lam. 2004. ‘Ministerial system in Hong Kong: a strengthening of the executive leadership’. Asian Perspective, vol. 28, no.1: pp.183-216
John Uhr, 1998. Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 163
Kwok, Rowena. 2003 ‘From Administrative State to Ministerial Ststem: The Quest for Accountability in Hong Kong’. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol. 41. no.1 pp. 101-128
Lau, Emily. 2002. Why we won’t get accountability. South China Morning Post, May 28, 2002, final edition
Marshall, Geoffrey. 1964. ‘Introduction’, in Geoffrey Marshall (eds), Ministerial Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-13
Peele, Gillian. 2004. Governing the UK. 4th ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. pp.46
Pyper, Robert. 1996. ‘Introduction: The Parameters of Accountability’, in Robert Pyper(eds), Aspects of Accountability in the British System of Government, Leicester: Tudor Business Publishing Limited. pp. 1-12
SynergyNet. 2003. Hong Kong Deserves Better Governance: An Evaluation of Hong Kong’s System of Governance and Its Performance. Hong Kong: SynergyNet. pp. 49
Tsang, Yam-kuen. 2002. CS' speech at Melbourne business luncheon. Info.gov.com.hk, August 19, 2002. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200208/19/0819175.htm (accessed September, 25, 2007)
Tung, Chee-hwa. 2002. CE on Principal Officials Accountability System. Info.gov.com.hk, April 17, 2002. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200204/17/0417216.htm (accessed February, 2, 2008)
Woodhouse, Diana. 1994. Ministers and Parliament. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 28-38
介绍
部长级责任( MR )普遍成立在威斯敏斯特的国家,尤其是在英国。阿娇皮尔认为,部长的责任是在英国议会的惯例。部长应该为他们的行为或部门结局(皮尔, 2004 :46 )向立法机关负责。它旨在加强问责制和保护公众利益。
香港作为一个世界级的城市在中国主权下,还设立一个部长负责中旬2002年夏天。前行政长官董建华先生, 2002年4月出席立法会。他宣布引入主要官员问责制的最终目标是那些主要官员“责任”的理念,特别是系统管理员,政务司司长,财政司司长,律政司司长及全体董事局( 2002年东) 。然而,许多事件证明威斯敏斯特部长责任制尚未完全适用于香港在这五年中,如汽车丑闻梁锦松及叶刘淑仪辞职。
在本文中,将使用英国作为一个例子,以说明港元的POAS是类似的传统观念部长负责。它也认为,威斯敏斯特的风格的概念可能只有轻微申请在香港主要是由于其政治上的限制。本文将分为四个部分。首先,它会说明威斯敏斯特的“部长负责”的概念。其次,它会找出这些问责制之间的相似之处和英国设置。第三,它会指出的政治机构是如何限制的做法。最后,它会使用汽车门丑闻问责制的实践来说明政治制度约束。
威斯敏斯特部长的工作角色和责任
威斯敏斯特的部长负责,是一个约定,不能很好地定义。要理解这个概念,它是更好的基本工作任务的“部长”的理念和“责任”分别来看看。
R. Pyper观察,一位部长的工作任务主要包括四个方面。他们应该领导部门,管理部门,试点立法议会代表的部门利益( 1996年Pyper :4 ) 。这位部长还玩作为看门的政策。他应该还负责他的政策的结果。当政策的结果可能造成意想不到的后果,他应该采取补救措施来解决这个问题。这些方面可以说明部长特别的作用和责任。
布里主张,应当顺应民意的政治演员。他也应该是负责他的行动,任何人,尤其是议会(布里1989: 25) 。他的想法“回应能力”和“问责”的概念。通过参加特定政策委员会议会回答反对党查询,能很好地保护公众利益。另一方面,透明度也可以实现。
简单地说,部长级责任不仅意味着占某些事情,部门行动,政策的结果,他的个人行为,但他也应该提供行政和立法分支的回应能力。他应该辞职,如果部长无法满足这些标准,或未能获得议会的支持。
威斯敏斯特部长级会议的部长负责责任的特点包括集体和个人的责任。据马歇尔,坚定信心,一致同意和保密的集体责任的三大关键要素(马歇尔, 1989 :3 ) 。的集体责任,这是最后的决定,内阁部长应该保护政策。他/她一定包含机密文件的传播,曾担任国家利益。另一方面,提供准确的信息,解释他的行为,并回答议会的询问是个别的部长负责。
常用部长负责成立在西敏寺系统。巴伦特说,部长的责任是议会宪法的一个重要特征,这是一个融合的行政机关和立法机关之间的权力(巴伦特, 1998 :120 ) 。融合的力量是指由立法机关也许充满的政府职位。由于多数党议会形式的政府,它始终是难以对行政部门给予严厉的批评反对。
伍德豪斯部长负责,有五个级别的问责。他们是redirectory性,提示性,解释性,修正的和牺牲(伍德豪斯1994:28 ) 。基于这些层面,部长应该为他的行动提供准确的信息和修改的缺点,他的部门。而且,最高级别是从私人或政治误判导致的辞职。通常来讲,部长应提供两种情况下辞职。当下议院通过不信任案,这意味着大臣应该辞职。这位部长还应该提供辞职,如果他未能通过重要法案在下议院。
的实践主要官员问责制( POAS )
在谈到问责制的引入,背景和原因,应检查。林迪福总结,有三大原因导致的问责制,比如,减少政策的失败,提高政府绩效,增加问责(林2004 : 197) 。首先,有一个提高公众问责,由于一系列的政策失败和丑闻,如85,000房屋政策及短桩丑闻的需求。其次,政府要加强她的表演所要求的外部专家,如梁锦松及马时亨加入政府。第三,政府实行部长制,加强问责。
基于上述原因,建立问责制,当东开始了他的第二个任期的行政长官。本届部长级会议系统的最终目的是提升政府主要官员问责制。此外,公务员在2002年之前不得不做政治工作。引入问责制,可以维持公务员的专业和中立的形象。此外, POAS试图找出合适的人,以服务社会,增强政策的实施。此外,问责制不仅旨在改善立法局(立法会)和执行之间的关系,但也带来了一个负责任的政府,公众(政制事务局, 2006年: 2 ) 。
的POAS的操作是复杂的和指定的。在这个制度下,主要官员将在政府系统内部和外部的选择。有主要官员共14人都参与在这个系统中,尤其是,这三个部门秘书局和十一名董事。他们的工作角色主要集中在政治上的作品,如,提供政策领导,回应立法会质询,并征集民意。此外,会有常任秘书长,公务员与D8排名,协助各部门委任官员。对于公务员,他们将保持政治中立。
建立问责制,也可以对政治制度带来了很大的影响。据林和祥,行政长官可以减少政府高级官员的政治影响和重要的作用下的的波阿斯系统(林:2004;祥: 2003 ) 。它暗示,公务员不能发挥作为统治香港的主要作用。 CE的领导,也可以加强,使亲政府的政党进入行政局(行政会议) ,并委任主要官员有着相似的政治信仰与CE 。行政会议已不再是作为一个咨询委员会,但执行内阁的任务在西敏寺系统,尤其是政策制定的最终决定。一般来说, CE是引入问责制的获得者。
威斯敏斯特的部长负责和问责制之间的相似性和差异性
由于一直采取POAS五年,政府和学术界认为,这是一个部长负责。曾荫权表示,问责制为“港式部长制” ( 2002年曾) 。分别C.Y.张先生还写道: “本质上是一个POAS形式的个人责任(长2005 :163) 。然而,这些声明暗示,不能完全复制POAS从威斯敏斯特。它只是遵循这些功能仅在名称和威斯敏斯特部长负责忽略了本质。
目标
这两个系统的最终目的是寻求问责。在的Bristish系统,议会可以占到部长的行为和他的政策失败。在香港,这些任命的官员理论上对立法会负责。由于代议制民主,它可以说这两个系统可向公众带来一个负责任的政府。根据大臣守则“基本法”第64条,这些任命的,不应该只参加定期的立法会议,但向公众提供准确的信息。然而,出席立法会会议,是被委任的官员的选择。任命的官员也主要是向行政长官负责的政策的成功和失败。然而,行政长官并非由普选。这是疑问,问责真的可以实现。
委任制度
预约过程是类似的。在英国,那些部长们建议由总理。他们应该获得批准从君主制。在香港,这些官员是由行政长官选择。中央政府可以决定任命。然而,不同的方法来获得权力,可能会影响其合法性。议会体制下的那些部长们应该先在大选中获胜。的POAS官员不面对选举。他们只由行政长官委任的政治与合同的基础。这显示香港特区主要官员的职务代表低于议会制度下的部长。由于这些任命的有低的合法性,张力之间始终存在的行政机关和立法会在香港。此外,也一个自相矛盾的POAS 。公务员事务局局长的任命,也是一名高级公务员。这种固有的缺陷似乎正在寻找政治中立的公务员违反了原来的目标。
立法机关的作用
议会或立法会是一个主要的机制,检查和监控委任官员的表现。但是,他们的做法是非常极端的。对于议会,不信任案是一种直接的方法,可以显示他们的不满。另一方面,也有一个“影子内阁” ,以监督政府规则使用委员会调查。然而,立法会没有这个强制力。议案辩论和私人法案是唯一的方式表达他们的不满。这些方法可以在CE上施加压力,要求委任的官员辞职,获得公众的支持和普及。然而,私有成员的议案辩论可以轻松推掉由分散的立法设置。因此,立法会不能发挥有效的作用威斯敏斯特的议会。
部长有他自己的监管服从。在英国,大臣守则是部长行动的指导规范。在香港,这是问责制主要官员守则取代。这两个系统都需要他们的官方宣布他们的兴趣,如金融和个人利益。这听起来,香港做了伟大的工作,以防止利益冲突为那些任命的官员。然而,张五常说的代码POAS是不够的建立奠定了基础,为发展个人部长级会议责任(长2003 : 260) 。它没有明确界定这三个层次的责任,比如,政策的结果,个人的不当行为和部门故障。代码并在此基础上,不仅意味着,监管不够具体的官员跟随,但也不能显著实施。
辞职
在威斯敏斯特和香港之间的差异是非常极端的。英国的惯例,部长应提供两种情况下辞职。首先,部长应该辞职后,不信任投票通过了下议院。其次,部长应提供辞职时,他的主要法案未能通过下议院的多数。在香港,这些方案可能无法导致的指定官员辞职。例如,梁锦松被卷入在租车丑闻。虽然他向行政长官提出辞职,行政长官可以有最终决定拒绝它。它表明,没有任何机制,导致主要官员下台。而且,它没有达到目的的问责制。
为了有一个简短的结论,它揭示了问责制可能只是学习的'关键'功能,从威斯敏斯特的风格。虽然他们的最终目的都是一样的,本质的传统部长级会议责任不能被充分的应用在香港,特别是监管和辞职。
香港的政治制度约束如何威斯敏斯特的部长负责的做法,一般来讲,其最终目的是POAS寻求香港特区政府的问责性。不过,也有许多事件表明,发展部长的责任是根据令人满意,如安东尼祥汽车丑闻和SARS事件。据约翰UHR长,一个有效的问责是建立在两个基础。应该有机制提供信息和制裁(UHR , 1998: 63;祥,2003 :256 ) 。尽管这些元素,不民主的选举行政长官,强势的行政主导制度和足够的渠道让公众表达自己的意见,也可能制约发展的部长级责任。
透明度低和信息不对称流
透明度有一个积极的关系和信息流。没有透明度的政府是为市民难以监控其性能和治理。伊娜的郭孟浩指出, “透明度是一个前提,如果市民有效守住部长负责进行有意义的排出” ( 2003:116国)政府考虑到。在香港,已经有公开资料守则。然而,我们的代码仍然是差强人意。获取信息很大程度上依赖于这些政府部门的态度。没有一个透明的政府和完善的信息流,它是很难部长级会议在香港发展的责任。这是很难追的个人责任或任何政策上的失败。
零散立法机关没有任何强制力
立法会享受更高的合法性,因为它是由完全选举在香港除行政长官。但是,它可能没有足够的权力寻求问责。这主要是由于基本法限制立法会的权威。首先,不信任投票不具法律约束力。即使立法会通过这项法案,部长仍然不会从他的办公室需要下台。据林,只有两个秘书,律政司司长及环境运输及工务局局长,会辞职,如果他们收到的投票不信任立法会(林, 2004 :203 ) 。二,立法会成员需要有CE同意,当他们提出的法案涉及公共开支或政治体制。第三组规则,以投票方式也提供了一个缓冲地带,为政府。那些尴尬的法案总是推掉由功能界别。例如,对梁锦松的不信任案最终推掉由功能界别和亲政府的政党。基于这些原因,不能寻求立法会为受聘的问责。
不民主的选举行政长官
行政长官选举的小圈子也制约的做法POAS 。他是唯一入选的由1006名选举委员会。由于行政长官并非由普选,他也不是完全向公众负责。虽然基本法“第73条指出,立法会弹劾行政长官,行政长官的高度,去除由中国政府决定。因此,人们认为,行政长官是香港社会,而不是中国只是负责。另一方面,行政长官有选择他的行政团队,尤其是主要官员的最高权力机构。然而,那些主要官员不得到力量通过公开选举,甚至由立法会批准。立法会议员刘慧卿,还批评POAS主要官员是从西方国家不同,因为缺乏代表。公众不能把他们的选票( 2002年刘)官员。由于这些任命的行政长官选举和任命是不民主的,公众无法保持问责容易。
强势的行政主导制度
香港特区行政长官享有的政治背景下,特别是形成他的政治团队的最高权力机构。提名过程和辞职都高度控制后,行政长官的喜好。它并不需要获得任何正式向立法会批准。此外,行政长官可以控制的信息流向立法会。基本法和立法机关内部规则提供CE可以使用公众利益为理由,拒绝提供任何有用的信息,向立法会。在此基础上,强势的行政主导的系统提供了一个防护罩,那些任命的,而这是很难寻求问责。
没有足够的渠道表达民意
加强问责,需要一个全面的渠道为公众表达自己的意见。然而,大多数的渠道,如反腐败,审计署署长的独立委员会专员向行政长官负责。张建宗指出,这是很难为公众相信这些监督者不受行政机关干预,而这些任命的官员均是CE (长, 2003 :266 )的领导下。寻找立法会议员是唯一的方式来表达他们的不满。不过,立法会议员也面临着一个很大的制约。例如,他们只能专注于一些有争议的问题和缺乏制裁功率。在此基础上,可以得出结论,没有足够的机构表示,公众的不满。
案例研究:梁锦松汽车门丑闻,由于这些参数,就提到问责制的做法,在理论上,本节将一个现实生活中的例子来说明:汽车门丑闻。梁的丑闻视为个人的不道德行为。他违背了问责制主要官员守则,因为他购买了一辆汽车,前第一个辞职的乘用车购置税提高。它是有利益冲突的情况。虽然他提供了一系列补救措施,捐赠和道歉,但仍然无法获得公众的信任。在此基础上,他提出辞呈。然而,终于接受了他的辞职四个月后公布这一事件。它没有违反部长负责的核心价值观,但也表现出问责制而不能正常工作,由于其政治制度。
梁的事件已经表明,信息流的高度由这些官员自己决定。据蔡, “苹果日报”要求梁先生购买汽车的原因来解释。然而,梁仍然没有任何回应在媒体和公众面前。其结果是,在媒体披露这一丑闻两天后(蔡2005 :154) 。如果不能提高透明度,问责制和责任的任命将不会被轻易举行​​。
立法不能有效发挥作用在寻求的责任梁锦松。如前所述,非信任投票失败,因为大多数的功能界别没有支持。此外,政制事务委员会确实呼吁弹劾电源。不过,政制事务局林瑞麟局长回答说, “基本法”并没有向立法会弹劾权下放。基于这种情况下,校长的任命梁锦松没有收到任何处罚的立法会。
这一事件表明,问责制和责任将无法实现,如果行政长官及主要官员的选择是不民主。一般来说,董建华的政府不直接向公众负责。此外,获委任只通过了CE没有LegCo.So批准,确定梁东负责。例如,他表示,他将只提供辞职,如果行政长官要求他这样做。这项声明显示梁做不仅缺乏问责制的概念,但也说明了不民主的机构限制部长负责的做法。
董建华行政主导体制发挥了作用扭曲问责制的性质。即使财政司司长试图为自己的过错负责直接提供辞职,他仍然可以在办公室的基础上支持董建华先生。当Anotny董建华在2003年3月提出辞职,他刚刚拒绝了梁的辞职,并给了一个正式的批评。这种情况下,强烈支持,部长不需要面对如果CE是愿意保护他的同事,他的责任。
7月第一事件不仅集中不满董建华的规则,但也透露了足够的渠道让公众表达自己的愤怒,对梁的丑闻。根据绩效考核的调查,在2002年开展中国大学,说梁的人气已经极度下降的丑闻后( 2003年黄:5 ) 。这表明,大规模的对安东尼的不满。立法会以来,他们的代表,不能施加任何措施寻求问责,公众成了愤怒。在此基础上,这是这些原因迫使人们加紧在2003年7月第一次抗议的一部分。
结论
东尝试将一个负责任的和负责任的政府,通过引入问责制。 POAS和威斯敏斯特的部长负责的目标是几乎相同的。然而,安东尼丑闻已经证明,远从威斯敏斯特之一的成功实践POAS 。迪福林指出, “部长制在香港的体制弱点,它是不切合实际的期望,将实现高度问责。” (林, 2004 :213 ) , “机构设置”包括信息不对称流动,分散的立法会会议行政长官选举不民主,占主导地位的行政系统和渠道不足,表达公众意见,在本文中。
为了克服这些政治约束的问责制,三个主要的解决方案应予以采纳。首先应建立一个民主和合法化的行政长官选举。这将带来: CE和他的执行团队面对公众critism的。其次,立法会的作用应该加强,让他们批准和弹劾权。第三,政府应建立一个更好的信息流,并让公众表达自己的意见,对这些部长。如果不能采用这些措施,核心价值观,问责制,回应和责任,问责制下很难实现。
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